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ABSTRACT
The power transmission grid plays an important role in modern society and its failure has
a significant impact. In the past, the grid has been subjected to malicious attack. This work
focusses on maintaining the steady state stability of the grid, either under times of com-
ponent failure (Such as FACT devices) or under situations of malicious attack, and then,
developing techniques to analyze the system stability.
This work develops upon existing analysis techniques, such as sensitivity and clustering
analysis to develop methods of mitigation of failure of FACTS devices. The analytic cluster-
ing method is compared with a Bayesian Network inference technique based technique that
is introduced and developed.
Further, the mitigation technique is extended to dynamically changing operating points
of FACTS devices, and the implementation for instances of failure and other states of com-
promised operation is discussed.
The final part presents an analysis technique, based on small signal analysis of the sys-
tem to analyze the vulnerability of the system to frequency instability in instances of spoof
attacks.
The results of the first part of this work explore the use of alternate techniques to improve
analytic computation techniques, weighing in the benefits of the various methods, with the
second and third parts addressing the impact of reactive support devices on system operation




tunbamum inbamum āgiya seivinaiyāī ulagaṅkaḻumāi * inbamil vennaragāgi iniya nal
vān suvarkkaṅgaḻumāi * manpal uyirgaḻum āgip pala pala māya mayakkukkaḻāl * inpuṟum
ivviḻaiyāṭṭuḍaiyānap peṟṟu ēdum allal ilanē * - śrī śaṭhakōpa, 3-10-7.
bhagavānēva svanīyāmya svarūpa-sthiti-pravritti-svaśēṣataika-rasēna anēna-ātmanā-kartrā
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Translated: The possessor of unquantified knowledge, undiminished strength, non-eroding
wealth, unsurpassed ability and energy alone, by own accord, preserver, director and propa-
gator of all things- sentient and otherwise, with the interest on that which is countless and
own, existing to adds glory, with own instruments of action, for the sole purpose of furthering
the glorification of infinite unquantifiable characteristics, the distinct sentient possessor of
those infinite unquantifiable honorable characteristics with none blemished who is glorified
by all, known as the one along with the one who does the six tasks, upon that which adds
glory, performed this action for himself and for his own accord, by himself.
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V Bus Voltage Magnitude
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1. INTRODUCTION
The power grid has seen vast leaps in operating procedures over the decades, and has, with
increasing use of computer based algorithms, interoperable devices and generic procedures
over the traditional use of proprietary, access restricted software, had an increasing need for
cyber resilient measures. A plethora of literature exists on cyber-physical analysis of power
systems, such as succeptibility of the system to cyber-attacks [1], [2] intrusion detection
[3], [4], [5] and mitigation [6]; this thesis contributes towards mitigation, by analyzing the
physical properties of the system.
1.1 Power System Vulnerabilities
While the primary parameters of a power transmission system, namely, V, θ, P, Q, f,
cannot be directly controlled as a MIMO system, various sophisticated control techniques
have emerged over the decades to maintain a standardized operating conditions for reliable
power transfer. From localized control devices to regulate bus voltages to wide area power
quality monitoring devices, the grid consists of multiple layers of control loops and protection
devices.
Irrespective of the scale of the control loop or the nature of parameters monitored and
controlled, certain elements are common to all the control loops; namely:
1. Data Generators: Sensors and State Estimators
2. Response Algorithms: Controllers and Protection Systems
3. Field Control Element
The response algorithms are designed to operate based on the parameter values that are
either measured or estimated using devices and algorithms that generate a measure of the
field data and condition it appropriately. Under situations of flawed data or its unavailability,
the response algorithms cannot be expected to function ideally. This work focuses on such
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scenarios, focusing on modifying response algorithms to suit the contingency and discusses
techniques of generating contingencies that would force response algorithms to force the
system towards unstable operating states.
The impact of cyber attacks on power systems can often have considerable physical
impact; for instance, in 2007, it was demonstrated in [7] how cyber attacks could permanently
damage a generator, utilizing relay operations. Similarly, in 2010, a Stuxnet attack [2] caused
substantial damages to Iranian powerplant and in 2016, an attack on the Ukraine Power-grid
caused large-scale blackouts. Given that cyber attacks have a considerable physical impact
on the system, this work explores the physical properties of the system as a methods of
negation and support to malicious cyber commands that modify the behavior of parts of the
system. While attacks such as the latter, which involved the disconnection of substations
need not be necessarily mitigated completely, the use of physical response would improve the
impact of failure. It should be noted that the techniques discussed are primarily mitigative
in nature, and should be used to assist system operation while appropriate techniques are
used to end the cyber intrusion.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This work introduces existing techniques that have been developed over the past decade
in Section 2, and describes the relevance and application of such techniques within the orig-
inal content of this work.
Section 3 introduces a Bayesian Network based inference technique for determining the
clusters of a controller online. This section details the training procedure, the inference
process and the implementation for a 7 Bus system. The section concludes by summarizing
the benefits, limitations of this technique viz. a viz. the existing clustering technique, and
offers insights on its scope for improvement.
Section 4 focuses on the problem of failure of FACTS devices in the system (Hereafter,
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interchangeably used with ‘Line Controllers’, ‘FACTS controllers’), and, based on identi-
fying the failed device’s ‘Support Group’ (Defined in Section 2), devises an algorithm for
recomputation of settings of other devices in the system (That need not necessarily pick up
the failure). The algorithm is implemented for two cases within a 7 Bus system as proof of
concept, and, the algorithm is tested for a failure scenario for the IEEE 118 Bus system.
The results associated with the three scenarios are summarized in the same section.
The next two sections summarize the small signal model that is traditionally used to
study the frequency stability of a system. It builds upon the classical generator model to
create an optimization problem, that, when coupled with Optimal Power Flow solution tech-
niques, would provide insights on the vulnerability of the system to a blackout, in cases of
cyber-attack at its present operating point. This optimization problem accounts for buses
that are deemed to be protected, and buses that are said to be ‘vulnerable’ to attacks. The
section concludes by providing a few visualization techniques for system vulnerability and
degree of freedom of system parameters.
The penultimate section summarizes the results provided in previously, and highlights
the contribution of this work to existing literature. The scope for practical application of
the various techniques, their limitations and potential for future research work are also sum-
marized in the same section.
The final section provides a short conclusion of the various topics discussed in this thesis
and indicates the coherence between the various topics discussed.
3
2. RELEVANT EXISTING TECHNIQUES
This section provides an overview of various existing techniques that are used and devel-
oped to present original ideas in later sections. This Section is divided in 3 subsections.
The first subsection, §2.1 introduces the concept of coupling, it’s significance in power trans-
mission systems. §2.2 explains the process of using the computing the sensitivity matrix of
a system and the use of coupling indices to study the impact of dynamic power supports
(Defined for the purposes of this paper and previous literature as ”controllers”). The final
subsection, §2.3 explains how the techniques explained are applicable to this work.
2.1 Coupling in Power Systems
This section details the impact of coupling on system dynamics and control. Coupling is
a phenomenon in nonlinear systems where a change in one of the manipulated inputs of the
system results in changes in multiple controlled outputs of the system [8]. Power transmission
systems are highly nonlinear and often, have a considerable degree of coupling of power-flows
between lines. In traditional control system design, the objective would be to decouple the
interaction of multiple process loops from each other.
However, within the context of power transmission systems, this is not so, for neither
is the traditional definition of manipulated inputs and controlled outputs applicable, nor
is coupling an unavoidable factor. Within the context of the power system, the real and
reactive power demands and generations at various nodes would be treated similar to the
manipulated inputs (Although, the cannot be completely manipulated) while the bus volt-
ages, angles, line flows and system frequencies can be treated as the controlled outputs,
although complete controllability of these output parameters is not currently possible. It
should be noted that this segregation of parameters into manipulated and controlled vari-
ables is generalized to explain the concept, although, it is possible for bus voltages to be a
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manipulated input (In the case of PV buses) etc. In such circumstances where the traditional
definition of manipulated and controlled variables are not applicable and the demarcation
between them is not explicit, the coupling effect of power flow in various lines is studied
and in lieu of decoupling, is used to aid in system controllability, as seen in the technique
developed in [9], [10].
For a power system with n buses and m lines, the coupling index (C.I.) of any two lines
i and j index is defined as the cosine of the angle between the corresponding row vectors of





Where the row vectors v1 and v2 are vectors containing the partial derivatives of the line
power flows to the line impedance. It should be noted at this juncture that the coupling
index can be defined for any two quantities in the system, so as long as a corresponding
and appropriate row vector is developed. The C.I. takes values in the range of [-1,1], with
magnitudes closer to unity indicating stronger coupling between the lines. For the purposes
of this work, the coupling sensitivities considered are that of power-flow to line impedances,
although Eqn. 2.1 is applicable to sensitivity analysis using various other parameter sets.
Figure 2.1 visualizes the concept of coupling of power-flow - impedance vectors. Three
vectors, two of magnitude 1.0 p.u. and one of magnitude 2.0 p.u. are represented in 3-D
space. The image is sourced from [10].
The following section elucidates how the concept of coupling index is applicable and
useful to power system analysis.
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(a) Completely Coupled Lines (b) Completely Decoupled Lines
Figure 2.1: Representation of Coupled and Decoupled Power-flow vectors in impedance space
of three lines.
2.2 Clustering of Lines
Clustering of lines is utilized to identify patterns in coupling of power-flows in lines and
use these clusters to, on an as is required basis, to bolster system operation in instances of
emergency state operation of the system.[12] and [13] define the emergency state operation
of a system as a state of operation wherein the system is still partially or entirely functional,
but, is under the verge of operating at contingency.
In order to identify potentials of support during such states of operation, the coupling
index of the system is processed to further yield the sensitivity matrix and form line clusters.
This (primarily) offline analysis is performed to obtain insights into the system behavior.
2.2.1 Computation of Sensitivity Matrix
The sensitivities of the power flows in system lines to change in system impedance are used
in analysis that is presented in later sections of this work. Linearized sensitivity parameters
between real and reactive line flows and line impedances are used to study the effects and
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possible advantages of the apparent change in line impedances due to dynamic support
devices on the grid.









Using the power-flow mismatch equations ∆pi and ∆qi (i = 1 to n), define a









Following this, factorizing the real and imaginary components of system impedance (i.e.,
conductance and susceptance respectively) into sums of partial fractions of line resistance
and reactance, equations for representation of line flows can be obtained. Following this, the




are computed in terms of line resistance and
reactance. The array of these equations are represented using a matrix γ .
γ =




Where k denotes the number of lines with D-FACTS devices installed on them or will be
affected directly by a FACTS device installed on a bus. These equations are used to compute
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a Jacobian, J ′ which is defined as follows:
J ′ =






where nv and nq denote the number of PV and PQ buses in the system. Based on this
formulation, the following relation between the concatenated mismatch vector equation, f
and change in polar representation of voltages and bus angles, ∆s is obtained as follows [10,
p. 14]:
∆s(θ,V ) = [−J ′]−1 .f(p,q) (2.8)
Based on the above definitions, a sensitivity matrix representative of the line flows to
change in line admittances. Unlike the previous matrices which were sparse, this matrix, Φ
is a full matrix.
Φ = [−J ′] −1.γ (2.9)
Following this, the Power Flow sensitivities matrices, Sigma, Γ and Loss sensitivities ma-
trix, T are defined based on the following relationships. Based on the combination of the
three sensitivity matrices, the final sensitivy matrix indicative of both direct and indirect
sensitivities, K is defined.
∆Pflow = Σ.∆s(θ,V ) (2.10)
∆Pflow = Γ.∆x (2.11)
∆PLoss = T.∆Pflow (2.12)
The final sensitivity matrix, K is obtained as a measure of all the above discussed ma-
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trices.
K = T. [Σ.Φ + Γ] (2.13)
2.2.2 Computation of Equivalent Line Flows
Based on the above technique, a sensitivity matrix, A′′ is computed as Σ.Φ + Γ and the
coupling indices is computed using its rows. The columns of A′′ are decomposed using LU
decomposition to identify lines in the system that can be deemed as critical, essential or
redundant.
1. Redundant Lines are those lines which can be removed from the set of controllable
lines and have no impact on overall system controllability.
2. Essential Lines are any minimal set of lines which together ensure complete system
controllability. Essential controllers are linearly independent (Will be explained in
Section 4.
3. Critical Lines are Essential lines that when removed from their minimal set cannot be
replaced by any other line that provides complete controllability. For instance, if two
sets of Essential lines {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 5} exist, then, controller 4 is not a critical
controller. However, if no set consisting of {1, 2, 3, x} (Where x ̸= 4) exists, then, 4 is
said to be a critical line.
Later in this work, the term lines will be replaced by Controllers as it is not useful to analyze
sensitivities when no devices are available to create a change in, or, an apparent change in
the line impedance.
The above classifications are identified by transforming the System Line Flow Equations
(SLFE) to an Equivalent Line Flow Equation (ELFE) set, the process being as follows:
LU factorization is applied on [A′′ ]T to obtain a change of basis:
[A
′′






Using Peters-Wilkinson method [14], [A′′ ]T is decomposed (Eqn. 2.14) into its lower trape-
zoidal and upper triangular factors. The permutation matrix is represented using P while the
triangular matrices (lower and upper) are represented using Lb and Ub respectively. M is a
sparse, rectangular matrix with rows corresponding to redundant controllers. The structure








As in traditional controllability analysis, the new basis, (2.16), too must be full rank for
a controllable system. This condition is fulfilled when m× (n− 1) matrix has a column rank
of (n− 1), where n is the number of buses in the system and m measurements of power-flow
are made. Lb and Ub are nonsingular for a controllable system, and hence, rank of [A
′′
]T
is obtained as the rank of the matrix LF T . Additionally, Lb has full rank and with (2.16)
multiplied posteriorly by L−1b to the equation’s RHS; thus, the row identities are preserved
after the transformation LF T . Each row of the matrix will, therefore, correspond to the
respective controllers [15].
Rows of In correspond to essential controls that are sufficient to assure independent con-
trollability of the equivalent line flows. If the essential controller is the only non-zero entry
of an equivalent line flow column, it is the only controller that can control it and is irreplace-
able, that is, it becomes a critical controller. Non-zero entries in the rows of R correspond
to redundant controllers while columns correspond to the equivalent flows which can easily
be mapped back to the original flows using the permutation matrix P obtained from the LU
decomposition step.
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Now, a summary of how how the Basis Decomposition of the transposed sensitivity can
be used to solve for the original linear system using back-substitution techniques is provided.





Where, LCER, equal to LTβ is the basis introduced in Equation (2.16). The transpose
is introduced to simplify notation in the successive steps. The equivalent line flows are
deconstracuted to determine the relative weightings of the actual line flows; the weightage
of the elements in R (that is, their values) are examined for the redundant controllers to
determine how they relate to the original sensitivities.
Considering that LU factorization is effectively Gaussian elimination. It (Gaussian elimi-
nation) is used to solve systems of linear equations by using elementary elimination matrices
Mi in a sequence of steps to reduce some system matrix A into an upper triangular form.
Back-substitution is then used to solve the original, linear system. Thus, using this technique
in the target problem, for some linear system of the following form:
Ax = b (2.18)
an elementary elimination matrix, M1, is introduced to zero-out all elements in the first
column barring that of the first row, such that only a11 remains as pivot. Should it initially be
a zero value element, appropriate pivoting process is utilized to make it non-zero. Therefore,
upon performing this operation:
M1Ax =M1b (2.19)
The solution remains unchanged and the process is continued with a22 and successively zero
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all the subdiagonal entries. This step is repeated (n− 1) times:
Mn−1...M1Ax =Mn−1...M1b (2.20)
MAx =Mb (2.21)
The resulting system is represented by upper triangular matrix U and solved with back-
substitution. The inverse of the elementary row operation matrix is the lower triangular
matrix L, and the LU factorization of (2.18) is as follows:
U =MA (2.22)
L =M−1 =M−11 ...M
−1
n−1 = Ln...Ln−1 (2.23)
M−1MAx =M−1Mb (2.24)
LUx = b (2.25)
∴ A = LU (2.26)
Graphically, the above steps applied on the transposed sensitivity matrix, LCER, can be
explained using its structure:
LCER =
Eq.1 Eq.2 . . . Eq.k

C/E 1 0 . . . 0
C/E
... ... . . . ...
C/E 0 1 . . . 1
R x x . . . x
R
... ... . . . ...
R x x . . . x
(2.27)
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Where C/E/R denote Critical, Essential and Redundant controllers in the actual system
equations respectively. The equivalent line flows are seen to be nothing but a linear mapping
of actual line flows and that the actual system sensitivities are be obtained by traditional
back-substitution solution techniques.
2.2.3 Clustering Technique
Clusters refer to a group of controllers that have similar sensitivities are are formed using
the above analysis techniques. Within each group, it is only necessary to control one line
flow (the target lines) because controlling one such flow impacts the others in a predictable
way, reducing the control to only a few select target lines. Additionally, this technique
identifies how the controllers are related to each other by finding the control support groups
[16]. Given that the controllability-equivalence sets are construed through clustering using
the coupling index, the selection of the number of clusters k is an important factor. Existing
literature used hierarchical agglomerative clustering “as it groups data by creating a cluster
tree or dendogram” [17], and is used for the results presented in later sections of this thesis.
2.3 Significance of Existing Literature to this Work
The above summarized techniques provide the basis for the results in this thesis in Sec-
tion 4. A step-wise explanation of the technique, with illustrative example based on the one
presented in [17] will be provided in the same section.
2.3.1 Online and Offline Application
Offline applications of the analysis technique includes identification of critical/essential
lines to system operation, leveraging the sensitivities of redundant controllers to fine-tune
system operation, improve controller placement and identify patterns in system operation
states and states of controllers. Online applications include the usage of the technique as
an optimal response process to respond to unnecessary controller settings changes, either
13
natural failure, unintended misoperation or adversarial presence [16] [17].
14
3. CLUSTERING ANALYSIS USING BAYESIAN NETWORKS
While the previous section, §2.2 summarized the use of existing clustering algorithms
and sensitivity algorithms to identify support groups, this section introduces a Bayesian
network (BN) approach to modeling power systems. Significant work on usage of Bayesian
Networks for Power System Applications, such as Reliability calculations, State Estimation,
Fault Analysis et al has been presented in [18, 19, 20, 21].
The work presented in this section builds upon existing literature, but, narrows its focus
to estimating the state of dynamic reactive support devices alone. A Bayesian network is
developed to represent a section of a power transmission system to predict the state of FACT
controllers distributed across a power transmission system. An introduction to Bayesian
network applications for power systems is provided in Section 3.1 and the rationale for using
BNs for this application is explained in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 explains the methodology
developed and the limitations that it may posses. The following section, Section 3.4 explains
the application of the methodology and the results obtained for a small, experimental 7 Bus
system. Following this, a summary of this section is provided.
3.1 Introduction to Bayesian Networks
Bayesian Networks are a type of Probabilistic Graphical Model that represents random
variables as nodes and the relationship between them as edges, in the form of Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAG). Directed Acyclic Graphs are graphical models were all the edges
are directed, and, no cyclic path exist in the graphical model. However, a graphical model
alone is not a Bayesian Network. The DAG model combined with a Conditional Probability
Distribution (CPD), with the probability of a node taking a certain value dependent on the
probability of its parent nodes taking the values they have [22].
Bayesian Networks are applicable only to systems which can be expressed in the form












Figure 3.1: Illustration of the use of a ‘True’ Distribution, P ∗ to discover a local probability
model and graph structure.
rule that is based on the given distribution of the variables.
Two important properties of BN are the local and global properties of the nodes, other-
wise called Local and Global Markov assumptions. Local Markov Assumption decrees that
given a node Xi and its parents, the node id independent of all its non-descendant nodes.
Mathematically, Xi⊥ND(Xi)|Pa(Xi). The Global Independence Property (Global Markov
Assumption) states that two nodes, or, two sets of nodes are independent of each other if
there exists no active trail between them. Mathematically, (Xi⊥Xj|Xk)|d− sep(Xi, Xj|Xk).
Local independence properties are useful in learning of immediate neighborhood. They
are used to develop global properties and develop a ‘good’ graph structure, where, a ‘good’
graph structure is said to be a graph structure that incorporates as many independence
properties of the system as possible. If all the nodes in a graph are connected, then, no
independence properties exist [23].
Given a distribution of data, P ∗, the goal of learning techniques is to use the data to
develop a local probability model θ∗ and predict a graph structure, G∗. This process can
be for one or more of the following objectives [24]:
1. Learn an approximate distribution of the parameters, P̃ that is as close as possible to
the actual distribution P ∗.
2. Predictive Testing: Finding the probability of a certain set of nodes taking a certain
value, given the values of the other nodes in the system. The usefulness of the developed
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model for the given application can be verified using a set of validation/test data.
3. Knowledge Discovery: M̃ ; with the goal being to infer relationships between variables.
Here, a ‘Confidence Score’, reflective about the conclusiveness of the result is required
to be estimated.
For the latter two objectives, a judicious trade-off between the variance and bias of the
model is selected. A more flexible prediction, ψ(X) is less sensitive and has a simpler clas-
sifier, but, is less accurate. A more accurate prediction would have a complex classifier, and
also risks being over-sensitive. A lower bias allows data to be fit easier (Thus, higher flexi-
bility), but, also has greater variance. A higher bias provides a more appropriate structure
and has less variance [24].
3.2 Applicability to Context of Study
The need to activate (D-)FACTs can often be simplistic, based on a linear relationship
with the current flowing through the transmission line (As seen in D-FACTS), or, at times,
can be an on/off device, such as SVCs. Irrespective of the nature of the device, in scenarios
of failure, the recomputation of settings of other dynamic reserve devices/controllers on-line
need not be merely localized, as noted in [17].
Under scenarios where the state of the power system before failure of controller, the
identity of the failed controllers is known, a properly structured BN can be used to esti-
mate which of the remainder controllers need to be activated based on inference and simple
mathematical computations, without the need to involve computation factors that process
the state of the system on-line. In summary, the BNs have desirable properties for this ap-
plication as they are structured based on exhaustive offline analysis to provide faster online
response.
While some may opine that Neural networks can be used more effectively, under the
context of this application, BNs are easier to re-train when additional controllers are incor-
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porated or when the threshold for activation for a controller is reconfigured. It would be
easier to retrain a BN under this context (When additional devices are added) than a Neu-
ral Network, although the latter is probably a more powerful tool. This advantage of BNs
provides an avenue for it to be explored as a possible method of understand the operation
of power-systems.
3.3 Training and Inference Methodology
This section elucidates on the training and inference methodology used to identify a
graphical structure and determine conditional probabilities. The parameters used to generate
nodes in the system were bus loads, generator dispatches, line currents and state of operation
of the D-FACTs. The corresponding dataset was generated using PowerWorld for a 7-bus
system under study, identical to the system studied in literature cited in previous sections.
One of the prime applications of clustering analysis is the selection of controllers to
activate in the case of failure of an active controller to offset the impact of its failure. While
analytical clustering analysis techniques incorporate the present operating state of D-FACTs,
in the technique presented here, the operating state of D-FACTs is simplified to an ON-OFF
binary, akin to most static compensators. While this may be a large generalization that
removes an advantage of D-FACTs, it is done as a caution due to practical considerations,
namely, generating an extremely large set of data that would result in overfitting the BN
trained.
3.3.1 Training Methodology
The topological ordering is assumed using the properties of the system, such as generation
is always determined based on the load demand and that the system bus voltages and line
currents influence FACTs controller settings. The same properties were used to determine if
a node could potentially be the parent to another node or not
A score based learning method is used to evaluate the graph structure in entirety, that
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Figure 3.2: 7-Bus System used to study the usage of Bayesian Networks for System Clustering
Analysis.
is, use a metric: The Goodness of a graph score, < G, θG > to select the most optimal graph
structure. The score as a cost function that is to be maximized. The score can be obtained
as a Likelihood Score or a Log Likelihood Score [25]. The Log Likelihood Score, SL(G,D)
is always negative. However, this search process (for a graph structure) is simplified in
this application, given that an approximate knowledge of the topological ordering of the
variables is known. This provides Prior Knowledge about the Bayesian Network’s structure.
The Structure Score can be either of:
1. Likelihood Score– Tends to prefer more dense and near full graph structures.
2. BIC Scoring– Serves as an approximation to Bayesian Scoring.
3. Bayesian Score– Complex due to its inclusion of a structural prior. Unlike the previous
19




P (Pa(Xi) = Pa
G(Xi))
where P (G) indicates the prior probability distribution, should be satisfied.
Since an approximate topological ordering is available and scores are inherently decom-
posable, the graph structure of the BN is estimated by evaluating the scores for each possible
group of parents for a node. The possible combination of parent-child edges are evaluated for
each individual node (‘FamScore’) and the combination with the highest score is selected.
For any node ‘i’ that can assume a valid node index, the overall score of the network is
defined as:
Score(G : D) =
∑
i
(FamScore(Xi|PaGXi : D)− Pi) (3.1)
A penalty term, Pi,dependent on the sum-squared distance of the prospective parent
and child nodes was included to prevent the graph from getting too dense. The FamScore
for each node is computed as a measure of its mutual information with the parents and its
entropy. Its mathematical representation is given by:
FamScoreL (X|U : D) =M. [Ip (X;U) : D] (3.2)
The mutual information of multiple nodes was computed using the following formula:
I (X;Y ;Z) = I (X;Y )− I (X,Y |Z) (3.3)
Based on the above formulae, each node was evaluated for the set of parents that maxi-
mized the individual FamScore for that node, that is, the set of parents that produced the
least negative score was selected. Given that prior knowledge of the line coupling is known
from analytic techniques covered in the previous section, after the final graph structure is ob-
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tained, it is ‘pruned’; wherein, excess edges are removed based on the known coupling indices
between the lines. If a coupling index is approximately zero (Or, smaller than some threshold
and hence, enough to be considered negligible), but, an edge is created, it is removed (or)
trimmed to get the final BN.
The conditional probabilities were estimated using the data used for training and the






I(xi[m] = Xi|Pa{xi} = {Pa{Xi}}) (3.4)
3.3.2 Inference Technique
The topological ordering was assumed using the properties of the system, such as gen-
eration always follows the load demand and line current determines fact controller settings.
The same properties were used to determine if a node could potentially be the parent to
another node or not.
3.3.3 Possible Limitations
The proposed BN’s estimated parameters do not directly provide the controller settings
(For non-binary controllers, such as D-FACTS), but only whether they should be computed
and possibly what percentage of the maximum value the parameter can be estimated to be.
The Bayesian Network is implemented assuming that the state of the power system
(That is voltage, power flows at various nodes and lines) is known while estimating whether
a controller’s activation is required or not. However, for practical implementation, parallel
computing would be preferred to this sequential process, in which case, the system would
need to be trained using fewer multinomial variables that don’t need to be re-estimated,
than using a larger number of binary variables.
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Restraining the application to the proof of concept provided in this section, it is possible
that the data generated could be insufficient to accurately model the network or that the
predicted graph structure does not accurately represent the parameters.
Although they are never practically observed, a symmetric power network, should one
exist would create identical data entries that will result in incorrect training and will not
provide proper results. Under such cases, each individual node needs to be considered and
modelled, which could result in state space explosion.
3.4 Application: 7-Bus System
The above methodology was tested on a 7-Bus/3 Controller case [26] that is serves as the
demo D-FACTs case in PowerWorld Simulator. The goal is to identify a Bayesian Network
structure that can be utilized to identify when a set of controllers are activated. The system
parameters are converted from their multinomial range to a binomial range to generate a
dataset that is used to infer the structure of the BN.
The reason for converting the multinomial distribution of power system state values to
binomial models is to reduce the data size (There exists 2̃9.3 M possible quantized combi-
nations of system parameters using a stepsize of 0.1 p.u. for all parameters) by clustering
the loads and generator dispatches into similar parameters. The semantics of the various
random variables used and the threshold to quantize them as binary values are tabulated in
Table 3.1.
The thresholds for declaring a parameter as 0 or 1 are selected based on knowledge of the
system and observation of overload conditions. An example of the conversion is provided in
Table 3.2.
The goal of training the PGM is to compute the controller settings for B1, B2, B3. This
is done using a few formulae if the estimate from the learned graph structure G does not
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Table 3.1: Various Nodes used in the Bayesian Network. Note that there is no P1 in the
table, it contains only P2 through P3.
Node Significance
I1 Represents the current between nodes 1 and 3.
I2 Represents the current between nodes 1 and 2.
I3 Represents the current between nodes 2 and 5.
B1 Represents the status of the controller of line between nodes
1 and 3.
B2 Represents the status of the controller of line between nodes
2 and 3.
B3 Represents the status of the controller of line between nodes
2 and 53.
P2 Real power at node 2. Takes additional subscript of G/L
depending on whether it indicates generation or load.
P3 Real power at node 3. Takes additional subscript of G/L
depending on whether it indicates generation or load.
P4 Real power at node 4. Takes additional subscript of G/L
depending on whether it indicates generation or load.
P5 Real power at node 5. Takes additional subscript of G/L
depending on whether it indicates generation or load.
PGen1 Real power generation at node 1.
PGen2 Real power generation at node 2.
PGen4 Real power generation at node 4.















I1 I2 I3 B1 B2 B3
Actual States 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.55 0.8 49% 31% 54% 0 0 0
Binomial
Conversion
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
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imply that the controller should be Off (That is, zero). One of the advantages of doing so is
to avoid the computation of matrix inverses. The Assumed Topological Ordering is:
P2,P3,P4,P5 followed by PGen1, PGen2, PGen4, I1, I2, I3 followed by B1, B2, B3.
While computing using matrices, for a specified P2 through P5, the rest of the parameters
are calculated, that is, generation and system parameters depend on the load demand. This is
treated as non-mathematical prior knowledge and hence, they are listed first, as they cannot
have parent nodes. However, after that point, it is difficult to ascertain distinctly which
parameters affect which others, yet, given that the generalized sequence is to determine bus
voltages then compute dispatches, both of which affect bus currents and hence, line currents,
a pattern of Generator Dispatches followed by Line Currents and finally D-FACTs state is
chosen. While it would be intuitive to state that only generation affects the line currents,
certain combinations of parameters simulated on PowerWorld Simulator shows that it is
possible for the line current to decrease when certain bus’ load profile and another bus’
generation increase, due to the nonlinear nature of the network. Hence, the line currents are
evaluated with both load and generation as possible parents.
The Dataset generated using PowerWorld Simulator has 503 observations (Akin to the
example illustrated in Table 3.2), with 439 observations used to train the BN. 64 observations
were used to validate the BN.
(a) Assumed normal prior for
Controller 1.
(b) Assumed normal prior for
Controller 2.
(c) Assumed normal prior for
Controller 31.
Figure 3.3: Normal Prior Curves assumed for the 3 Controller nodes.
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Figure 3.4: Initial Bayesian Network Graph Structure
Based on the analytic system analysis, it was noted that the edge between I2 to B3 exists
in the BN, although its coupling index is approximately zero. Hence, this edge is pruned to
get the final BN, shown in Fig. 3.5.
3.5 Results and Summary
The validation was done by generating observations for power, voltage and current nodes
and estimating the probability of B1, B2, B3 being unity. 64 Observations that were unused
in the training of the network were used to validate the graph. These datasets were used to
check for True Positives, True Negatives, False Positives and False Negatives.
The nine tabulations (In the appendix) list the conditional probabilities that were es-
timated based on Fig 3.5. Based on the conditional properties, it is observed that the
correlation between load demands and generation is either linear or an exponential relation.
However, there is no strictly increasing or decreasing trend between the line currents and
controller states with their respective parents. All the priors assumed were normal distribu-
tion curves with peaks at 0.7, 0.7 and 0.8 for B1, B2, B3 respectively. The priors assumed
a variance of unity, and depending on the location of the peaks of the posterior, controllers
were either set to on or off states.
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Figure 3.5: Pruned Bayesian Network Graph Structure, with edge between I2 and B3 re-
moved.
Table 3.3: Validation results for Controller # 1, B1
No. of occurrences % of Results
True Positive 35 54.688%
True Negative 26 40.625%
False Positive 0 0%
False Negative 5 4.687%
Based on the above priors, the results of the 64 tabulations (Simulated Vs Graphically
predicted) are shown below. The definitions of True Positives/Negatives et al. are as follows:
1. True Positive: Both the simulation and the predicted structure predict Bx=1.
2. True Negative: Both the simulation and the predicted structure predict Bx=0.
3. False Positive: The graph structure predicts Bx=0 while the simulation predicts Bx=1.
4. False Negative: The graph structure predictsBx=1 while the simulation predictsBx=0.
In real life cases, false positives would not cause system instability, only increase the
cost of operation, and possibly force certain local response systems to act. However, false
negatives, which could cause a key controller to not turn on, could cause line overloads or
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Table 3.4: Validation results for Controller # 2, B2
No. of occurrences % of Results
True Positive 14 21.875%
True Negative 26 40.625%
False Positive 12 18.75%
False Negative 12 18.75%
Table 3.5: Validation results for Controller # 3, B3
No. of occurrences % of Results
True Positive 26 40.625%
True Negative 20 31.25%
False Positive 8 12.5%
False Negative 10 15.625%
not provide crucial reactive support. The following image (Fig. 3.6) graphically illustrates
the percentage of true predictions for each controller, with B1 corresponding to the highest
number of predictions. It could be due to the reason that B1 was activated more often than
the others, followed by B3 and then B2.
If one neglects the economics of operation, assumes that an unnecessary operation of a D-
FACTs device does not necessarily cause system instability, and group the True predictions
and False Positives as acceptable results, the results improve, with the probabilities of taking
an incorrect action being 0%, 18.75% and 12.5% respectively. While this is not an acceptable
rate of inaccuracy, supplementing the activation logic with various other measurements and
operator knowledge could help improve the results.
The predicted Bayesian Network had over 95% accuracy while predicting the state of
Controller 1, with poor results for the other two controllers. When the economics of operation
of operation were factored out, the ‘accuracy’ of controller 3 improved to 87.5%, while
controller 2 did not see a considerable leap in its prediction. The prediction accuracy can
most probably be improved when the other elements in the power system (Bus voltages
and phase angles, lines without controllers installed) are factored into the graph. It is
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Figure 3.6: Graphical illustration of the Percentage of the correct predictions (TP + TN)
for the three controllers.
hypothesized that inclusion of other line currents (that is, lines with no direct connection
to D-FACTs) could improve the results for controller 2. Results of controller 3 could be
improved when a relationship between it and other controllers is considered and factored
into the structure inference step.
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4. DISTRIBUTED FACTS FAILURE MITIGATION*
This section provides insights into the recomputation techniques used in system recovery
technique during distributed controllers’ failure, based on the methods developed in Cha-
paters 2.2 and 3. This section focuses on the methodology of recomputation of settings of
controllers in support groups. The role of this methodology within the overall framework of
controller failure response (Such as the ones discussed in [17]), is highlighted by the green
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Figure 4.1: Mitigation of Distributed Controller Failure, highlighting the role of the DFM
algorithm and the overall system response.
This section is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides an overview of the solution
technique, followed by Section 4.2, which explains the mathematical models developed and
employed in the technique. Section 4.3 introduces and elucidates on the Distributed Con-
troller Failure Mitigation (DFM) Algorithm. The following sections, 4.4 and 4.5 provide
results of the application of this technique to a 7-Bus system and the IEEE 118-Bus system.
*Parts of the results presented in this section are reprinted with due acknowledgments from ‘K. Raghu-
nath, K. Davis, “Mitigation of Distributed Controller Failure”, Clemson Power Conference, Sep 2018’, with
the reprinted material indicated as per copyright holder (IEEE) requirements.
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The final section summarizes and concludes this section.
4.1 Overview of DFM Algorithm
The use of Flexible AC Transmission (FACTS) devices on transmission lines provide a
technique of controlling power flow between buses while improving the cost-effectiveness and
reliability of the grid’s operation. The DFM Algorithm is a technique of computing the set-
tings of any variable FACTS device, with multiple devices on the same line or bus modeled
in bulk. The algorithm proposes a technique for mitigation of the effect of a dysfunctional
controller (‘Dysfunctional’ and ‘failure’ is defined for the purposes of this thesis as FACTs
that do not operate at the desired settings) through analysis of the effect of other controllers
in the system on the concerned line to determining corrective actions in the settings of the
other devices, while accounting for stable range of bus voltages and angles of the system.
The primary motivation for developing such mitigation techniques is to compensate for
controller failure in system operations. For instance, a failure of a FACT device would result
in an increase in line current, which could be picked up by a protective relay. While moni-
toring need not necessarily result in the tripping of breakers, it is an undesired event.
The DFM algorithm computes the maximum corrective action that can be made by other
FACT devices in the system through online computations. The selection of the other FACT
devices for effective mitigation can be done via online or offline analysis techniques, such
as the ones discussed in [17]. A reference list of effective controllers that can compensate
for the failure of the controller in focus is created and used as rlookup in the algorithm to
make corrective computations. The computations determine the change in the effective line
impedance that is required from the compensating controllers to mitigate the failure. Based
on the type of FACT device, the p.u. change in impedance can be converted to a propor-
tional control signal that triggers the device to make the corresponding reactive injections
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into the line.
This algorithm assumes that the failure of the device and its location is known, and
based on prior knowledge of the coupling effect of other controllers on the dysfunctional con-
troller’s line, the algorithm selects a set of functional controllers and performs computations
based on the proposed algorithm to compensate for the increase in line current due to the
controller failure. For example, in order to determine a device’s failure, periodic estimation
of the line impedance using the reactive power flowing through the line and comparing the
estimated value with the results of the line impedance estimated using the operating state
of the controller can be used as a technique for detection.
4.2 Mathematical Models Used
The DFM algorithm uses previously available data of load and generation distribution and
knowledge of controller support groups (Explained in literature review) to perform online
computations to find the new settings of the devices. The selection of controller support
groups can be done via offline analysis, as seen in Recurrent techniques that are discussed
in [17], or, using online techniques. The results presented later in this section use offline
analysis, that is, Recurrent techniques. Details on the selection techniques are presented at
the end of this section where they are brought up for discussion.
DFM computes change in effective line impedance(s) required using the AC Power Flow
equations and Newton-Raphson iterative method to solve them. For some bus ‘i’. the real
and reactive power consumed are expressed using the equations:









Table 4.1: Tabulation of parameters used in the DFM algorithm.
n Number of buses
m Number of lines
M Number of controllers modeled in bulk (In the case of
D-FACTs, M ≤ m)
c Number of controllers that have failed
z Number of controllers in the identified support group
Vi Voltage at bus ‘i’
θi Voltage angle at bus ‘i’
Si=Pi + jQi Complex power at bus ‘i’
SGi=PGi +
jQGi
Complex power injection at bus ‘i’
SLi=PLi +
jQLi
Complex power consumption at bus ‘i’
YBus = G +jB Admittance matrix of the system
Subscripts
i,j Bus indices (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n)
Since conductance of lines (G) is usually far smaller than its susceptance (B), G is
ignored. Additionally, it should be noted that since the results of this algorithm are susceptive
quantities computed by using partial derivatives, even a significant value of conductance does
not considerably affect the final results; however, there is a small negligible effect, due to the
nature of the system reactance being affected by dynamic support devices. Thus, upon this
simplification, the equations are reduced to De-Coupled line flow equations, as follows:








The above equations are differentiated partially with reference to the line susceptance for
all target lines, that is, lines with FACTS devices. For some line lij (j = 1 to n, j ̸= i), the
partial derivatives of the power flows with respect to that line’s susceptance is used. These
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In an ideal condition where all bus voltage magnitudes are 1.0 p.u. and bus angles zero
degrees, the partial derivatives of real power tend to zero and the partial derivatives of reac-
tive power tend to unity. While this is not practically feasible, these ideal conditions serve
as a equality constraint that can be implemented in the DFM algorithm as a internal con-
straint during iterations for correction computations. These conditions are flexible, and can
be replaced with any other constraint that is deemed necessary, depending on the scenario.
∂Pi
∂Bij
= |Vi||Vj|sinθij = 0 (4.7)
∂Qi
∂Bij
= |Vi||Vj|cosθij = 1 (4.8)
Using the above two equations of the partial derivatives of real and reactive power with
respect to line susceptance, which play the role of an internal checker for the algorithm’s
computations during iterations, the DFM algorithm computes the change in susceptance
of the target device. A convention of first utilizing partial derivatives of reactive power,
before real power, is chosen so that the matrix formed as a result of the above computations
is not singular. A matrix consisting of only the partial derivatives of reactive power, or
the partial derivatives of reactive power and real power, will have elements that are both
(approximately) unity and zero, thus not being singular. A highly impractical scenario of
interconnecting all buses with each other would cause the matrix formed to be a singular
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matrix. Since it is highly impractical, the matrix formed is considered to be always invertible.
One corrective computation (That is, a non-iterative computation scheme) is made for each
coupled controller based on the clustering results. For a system with ‘n’ buses, ‘m’ lines,
‘M’ controllers (M ≤ m) and ‘c’ failed controllers, computations are performed using less
than ‘m – c’ partial derivative equations and can use a minimum of ‘m – M + c’ partial
derivative equations for validation. A controller with strong coupling to all other controllers
would require the maximum number of computations, that is, (m – c) computations. The
usage of equations is summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Summary of Partial Derivative Equations Utilized in the DFM Algorithm.
Equations Available Control Computations Required Equations Available for Validation
2m ≤ m - c ≥ m - M + c
4.3 DFM Algorithm Methodology
The detection of controller failure can be performed using estimation techniques and one
of the possible estimation techniques has been briefly states in Section I. Assuming that the
dysfunctional controller has been detected, the DFM technique operates using the following
steps:
1. Identify location of controller(s) under failure or misoperation.
2. Check if any limits or constraints have been violated. If they have not and the correc-
tion is deemed unnecessary, exit algorithm.
3. Form a mathematical construct where the devices are operating at their default/zero
state settings. If it is a misoperation and not a failure, substitute the default value
with the available estimate of operating point.
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4. Look up controller support groups to form a Support Susceptance Group column vec-
tor, B′ containing the effective susceptance of lines affected by devices in the support
group.
5. If any of the devices in the support groups have failure, eliminate them from Support
Susceptance Group column vector.
6. Eliminate multiple listing of controllers in B′.
7. Assign ‘z’ = Size of B′.
8. If any voltage and bus phases violate any constraints and have not been addressed by
a local response device, set them to the pre-failure value in the computation constraint.
9. Compute ∂Qij
∂Bij
∀ i = 1...n, i ̸= j
10. If z > m, compute ∂Pij
∂Bij
∀i = 1...z −m, i ̸= j
11. Form Susceptance Jacobian matrix, Js of magnitude ′z×z′ based on the partial deriva-
tives.
12. Form function vector, Fs = [Q1Q2...]T of row length ‘z’.
13. Compute ∆B = −J−1s Fs
14. Use ∆B to update the base YBus matrix and convert the apparent change in suscep-
tances to controller settings.
15. Verify that voltage and bus angle limits are not violated by using a fast approximation
technique.
16. If required, hone the controller settings using further iterations.
17. Stop
35
Once the devices are detected, the DFM algorithm is designed to respond only if neces-
sary. The algorithm illustrated above highlights one of the possible scenarios in which it is
designed to execute. The rationale for this is straightforward; it is to prevent unnecessary
computations in scenarios where local response devices are sufficient to address the unde-
sired state of operation, or, in scenarios where the effect of failure in negligible on system
operation state. Once the algorithm is triggered, a column vector consisting of the default
settings of the devices in the case of failure, or, in the case of the last known operating state
of the device if it misoperates and is at a different setting. This column vector is defined as
Bx, with the elements being the effective line susceptance in the case of D-FACTs.
Bx = [Bfl1Bfl2Bfl3...]
T (4.9)
Once the devices under failure or misoperation are identified and the need to utilze the
algorithm is determined, they are mapped to their Support Group Clusters to obtain the set
of devices that can be used to mitigate the effect of failure or misoperation. Depending on
how the support devices are selection, the following selection techniques are utilized [17].
1. Recurrent CE Selection: Recurrent CE selection techniques are support group selection
schemes that utilize the history of the system’s operating states to choose support
controller selection. Thus, Recurrent Selection techniques are useful in offline analysis,
allowing for support groups to be looked up. Recurrent CE Selection Technique utilizes
a history of the power system states and clustering analysis across the states to form
clusters of system devices that play a critical or essential role to system controllability.
2. Recurrent R Selection: Computed in the same technique as described above, it is a
selection technique that selects devices that have a redundant role in enforcing system
controllability.
3. Current CE Selection: Current Selection techniques utilize the present operating point
of the power system and can be utilized as an online tool. The Current CE Selection
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performs equivalent line flow analysis of the system when a failure is detected and then
selects the most effective Critical and Essential Controllers that can be utilized.
4. Current R Selection: Similar to the Current CE Selection, the Current R Selection
performs online analysis to utilize redundant controllers for system response.
5. Ranked R Selection: Similar to other redundant selection techniques, the Ranked R
Selection utilizes redundant controllers, but, utilizes them in a ranked order of their
impact on coupling.
Selection techniques that utilize Critical and Essential devices are always more effective
in mitigating device failure and misoperation than redundant devices. However, redundant
devices can be utilized to provide additional changes in settings that can assist moving the
system closer to its original state under scenarios where the settings of Critical and Essential
devices are saturated and additional ‘thrust’ in the direction of saturation is required.
In scenarios where a support device is unavailable, either because its settings are satu-
rated, or, if it too is not properly operational, then, it can either be replaced in the B′ vector
by its redundant counterparts, or, if no redundant counterparts exist, it is eliminated from
the vector and the remaining devices are utilized for mitigation. At times, it is possible to
have a controller multiply listed in B′ (When two devices in the same support group fail
simultaneously) and hence, before computations are performed based on it, it is filtered for
redundancies/multiple listings.
The power system computation is set up utilizing that last available system state estima-
tion, with any violations and changes set to the state during the last available system state
estimate during non-failure. This can include voltages, bus angles (directly) and power-flows
on transmission lines (indirectly). The direct constraints can be set as voltage and bus an-
gle set points. Power-flows can be incorporated as additional inequality constraints, or, be
converted to an equivalent voltage-bus angle combination that mathematically yields the
desired power-flow and enforce those values as an equality constraint.
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The above details are considered to be data pre-process for the core of the algorithm.
Steps 1 – 8 of the algorithm correspond to this; the core of the DFM algorithm Newton-
Raphson method to compute the change in susceptance that is required by supportive con-
trollers to enforce the desired system constraints (Demonstrated in results with system volt-
age and bus angles within tolerable limits). Since complete control of system cannot be
achieved with the failure of a critical controller, the DFM algorithm does not make multiple
iterations to re-compute a possible combination of controller settings that will best satisfy
a set of constraints and limits. In such cases, a solution that would satisfy a majority of
convergence criterions are selected as the final results.
The matrix J ′ is used as a Jacobian to compute the change in line susceptances that is
required. It is formed using equations partial derivatives; and is employed in a manner similar
to the Jacobian matrix formed for power flow calculations to estimate the bus voltages.
However, the derivatives used in the latter are with respect to bus angle and voltage, while
the proposed method uses derivatives with respect to susceptance. Based on the computed
value of J ′, the calculated vectors are substituted in the formula for multivariable Newton-
Raphson iterative solution and the change in solution is calculated. This is then updated to
get a new Bx. The corresponding equation is expressed below.
Bi+1x = B
i
x − J ′−1Fs (4.10)
For scenarios where multiple iterations of corrective computations are implemented, the
convergence criterion for the algorithm is set to satisfy both the following three relationships.
Although there is no explicit constraint on the bus angles, they are implicitly accounted for
in the second constraint. Any other additional constraints can be added on to these three.
These three only form a minimal set of convergence criterion, and are not an absolute
representation on the constraints under which the DFM algorithm can operate.




| ≤ ϵP ∀ (i, j) (4.12)
lflow(i,j) ≤ llimflow(i,j) ∀ (i, j) (4.13)
Where parameter ϵ is a small convergence criterion close to zero. Additionally, the
tolerance limit for voltage ϵv can be varied based on known operating history, system PV
characteristics, or a desired set point, in the case of PV buses. A summarized illustration of
the above process is depicted in the flowchart in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Simplified Flowchart depicting a summary of the steps performed in the DFM
algorithm.
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4.4 Application: 7-Bus System
The application of the DFM algorithm is divided into two parts. The first of the parts
concentrate on utilizing the DFM algorithm to recompute D-FACTs settings while the second
focuses on the role of the algorithm in larger system response. The role of the two parts
discussed in these results in overall system response is presented in Fig. 4.1. The computation
of equivalent line flows in overall system response, based on existing literature is highlighted
in the first subsection below. The 7-Bus system is depicted in Fig. 4.3.
Figure 4.3: 7-Bus System used to illustrate DFM Algorithm and Overall Algorithm
4.4.1 Equivalent Line Flows
This section demonstrates the computation of equivalent line flows for the 7-bus system
operating at a load distribution (In per unit) of [1.12 1.57 1.50 0.80 1.50 3.0 2.0]. It should
be noted that parts of the results presented below are published in [17]. The D-FACTS
scenarios demonstrated in this scenario utilize the sensitivity of total power flow (In MVA)
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to line impedance, based on the AC power flow equations. The sensitivities are computed
analytically, reflecting both direct (i.e., change in impedance of a line and its direct impact
on that line’s power flow) and indirect (i.e., change in impedance of a line and its indirect
impact on all other lines’ power flows) sensitivities [10].
While the results presented in this section of the thesis discus mitigation strategies of
a power system using D-FACTS, the methodology developed is independent of the type of
device and can be extended suitably to any dynamic control support to the power grid. While
methods presented in this paper are generic and can be used for any power system, due to
the nonlinear nature of power systems, it is possible that controllers installed on certain lines
cannot mitigated using the support group responses developed. This could be due to two
causes, either that the support groups cannot sufficiently manipulate the power flow in the
line of the controller under concern or that no support groups exist. Such circumstances can
be averted by optimal controller placement and including redundancies.
The line flow groups are discovered by cluster processing of the sensitivity matrix’s rows.
The Cosine similarity of row vectors vi and vj of A
′′ (coupling index) is used to find coupled
sets of lines as clusters that are approximately orthogonal to each other [28]. Following
this, the set of critical, essential, and redundant controllers are calculated by decomposing
the transposed sensitivity matrix using LU decomposition. The critical, essential, or redun-
dant status of a controller is determined based on the coupling of the columns of A′′ (rows
of [A′′ ]T). Applying LU factorization to [A′′ ]T yields a change of basis, decomposing it
into two triangular matrices [14]. The equivalent numerical structure of the Upper Triangle
of the decomposed Sensitivity matrix can be found in Table 4.3 (Originally published in [27]).
Utilizing the decomposed basis’s inverse, the transformed basis of the form below (in
equation 4.14) is obtained. The value of the matrix elements in the given (above) operation
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Table 4.3: Representation Upper Factor matrix of the Sensitivity Matrix for 7-bus system.
The corresponding results are presented in Table 4.12.
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
EQ.L1 1.9165 -0.3014 0.6138 0.4783 -0.7696 1.3766
EQ.L2 0 -1.6761 -0.5473 -0.7116 -0.9459 0.4046
EQ.L3 0 0 -1.4221 0.7592 -0.7507 -0.6497
EQ.L4 0 0 0 1.2547 -1.2407 1.2444
EQ.L5 0 0 0 0 -0.0041 0.0113
EQ.L6 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0063








Table 4.4: Representation of Transformed Basis matrix, LCER for 7-bus system. The corre-
sponding results are presented in Table 4.12.
EQ.L1 EQ.L2 EQ.L3 EQ.L4 EQ.L5 EQ.L6
1.0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1.0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1.0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1.0 0
In
0 0 0 0 0 1.0
-0.0015 0 0 0.090 0 0
-0.0145 0 0 0.923 0 0
0 1.51 0 -0.002 -1.064 0.746CR
-0.125 0 0 -0.187 0 0
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Writing the results of Table 4.3 in the form of equations:
EQ.L1 =1.9165 · T1 − 0.3014 · T2 + 0.6138 · T3+ (4.15)
0.4783 · T4 − 0.7696 · T5 + 1.3766 · T6
EQ.L2 =− 1.6761 · T2 − 0.5473 · T3 − 0.7116 · T4 (4.16)
− 0.9459 · T5 + 0.4046 · T6
EQ.L3 =− 1.4221 · T3 + 0.7592 · T4 − 0.7507 · T5 (4.17)
− 0.6497 · T6 (4.18)
EQ.L4 =1.2547 · T4 − 1.2407 · T5 + 1.2444 · T6 (4.19)
EQ.L5 =− 0.0041 · T5 + 0.0113 · T6 (4.20)
EQ.L6 =− 0.0063 · T6 (4.21)
The above equations (4.15) - (4.21) are the linear mapping between the target line flows
and the equivalent line flows that can be seen in Table 4.3. The corresponding ranking of
redundant controllers can be seen in Table 4.5.
The transformed basis indicates the ranking of redundant controllers; they are primar-
ily designed to operate when compromise or failure occurs for any essential controllers (in
their corresponding column in In). The entries of R give the sensitivity of each equivalent
line flow to each redundant controller. For example: If the essential controller of EQ.L4 is
compromised, from the transformed basis it is clear that redundant controller CR2 has the
highest impact on EQ.L4. CR4 has the next highest sensitivity and is followed by CR2. Both
CR1 and CR3 have low sensitivities and would not be effective if used alone. Essential con-
trollers with no redundant controller support have corresponding entries of 0 in R. Based on
the specific compromise or failure situation, these rankings can be used to employ the most
sensitive redundant controllers or utilize all controllers such that highly ranked controllers
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are prioritized. Table 4.5 summarizes the ranking of the redundant controllers for the six
equivalent line flows computed for a selected operating point of the system.
Table 4.5: Ranking of Controller groups in descending order of the effectiveness using equiv-
alent line flows for the 7 Bus system.
Ranking of Redundant Controllers
Equivalent Line Effective Controllers Ineffective Controllers
EQ.L1 CR4 >CR3 >CR2 CR3
EQ.L2 CR3 CR1, CR2, CR4
EQ.L3 N/A CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4
EQ.L4 CR2 >CR4 >CR1 >CR3 N/A
EQ.L5 CR3 CR1, CR2, CR4
EQ.L6 CR3 CR1, CR2, CR4
While the above results are sufficient for Current selection techniques, they are insufficient
for Recurrent selection techniques. In order to cluster the lines and obtain support groups,
the 7-bus system’s operating states are studied with upto variations of ±30% of the line
impedance, which is based on the practical device limits [26] [17]. With these operating points
and device combinations, controller role and control support groups are recalculated and
compared. Using this process on multiple devices to generate a large set of operating points,
patterns of recurrent essential controllers and recurrent critical controllers are discerned.
Controllers 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 frequently appear as essential. The numerical results of these analysis
is identical to original work developed in existing literature [27]; hence, it is not included
here.
Based on the above analysis, the overall system response to controller failure is decided.
4.4.2 Results: DFM Algorithm Tuned Settings
The DFM algorithm was tested for a few controllers in the system under two conditions-
scenarios where the algorithm in not required and scenarios where the algorithm is required.
Both scenarios were considered to verify the security and dependability of the algorithm’s
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operation respectively. Results are initially presented for one iteration of computation, and
then for multiple iterations. The effectiveness metric utilized in the results is the deviation
from 1.0 p.u. voltage magnitude.
In the following results, originally published in [29], it is seen that the chosen criterion of
bus voltages being closer to an ideal value do not improve with multiple iterations of the DFM
algorithm. Thus, it can be concluded that it can be used non-iteratively for small systems
to provide effective mitigation. This conclusion is illustrated as a plot of bus voltages for
the 11 controller system; there exists a relatively greater difference in bus voltages between
iterations (when compared to the 3 controller case). However, on absolute terms within the
scenarios themselves, the difference is negligible.
The first set of results are presented for the PowerWorld Demo case of the 7-Bus system
[26], that has three D-FACTs installed. The 7-bus system is divided into 3 areas with 11
transmission lines, 2 of which run parallel from bus 6 to 7. Although there are no FACT De-
vices installed on the lines, the algorithm would consider the equivalent effective impedance
by both lines in computations. In such a case (As described in section VII), the overall sus-
ceptance change required by the lines is computed by the algorithm and another topology
sensitive algorithm needs to be added to obtain the individual changes required.
The present case has D-FACTs installed in lines 1-2, 1-3 and 2-5. The devices are current
sensitive, active when line current is between 75% and 100% of rated limit. They vary the
effective admittance of the lines up to 30% of the base value, which correspond to j5.94,
j1.2413 and j2.4827 respectively. The algorithm is applied to a situation in which the
controller from bus 2 – bus 5 fails. The algorithm is tested for two conditions:
1. The controller fails, but at a juncture where no injection is required.
2. The controller is in operation, but becomes dysfunctional suddenly, that is, injects 0.0
pu of susceptance.
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Since the voltages in the base test case are close to unity, a sum squared error is computed
considering the bus voltage magnitudes and ignoring the angles. It is computed as follows:
E =
∑n




The initial results presented are computed with a single iteration of Newton-Raphson
solution. The ‘limits’ referred to in the tables are the maximum change in line susceptance
that can be achieved by a D-FACTs device. In situations where the computed correction value
is greater than the maximum achievable limit, the correction value is set to the achievable
limit.
The ‘suggested ∆B’ parameters in the tables is the change in line susceptance that is re-
quired to compensate for the failure of controller(s) under scrutiny, post-saturation. This is
a generic quantity that can be used to compute the new settings of a FACTs device based on
its operation principle. While all results herein are indicative of D-FACTS, these parameters
can be used to compute the settings of any generic FACTs device by converting the values
of ∆B to change in line impedance and computing the operating point of the device that
would cause such a change in the line impedance. In the case of controllable shunt devices
connected to buses, two or more lines are incorporated into the algorithm reflective of that
device, and once the results are obtained, suitable computations are performed to convert
the change in susceptance to the change in firing rate of the device.
Although controllers on all lines are impractical and superfluous, this case is considered
as it contrasts the fundamental scenario seen above, where there are more equations for
validation than the ones required for computation. This condition requires the maximum
number of corrective actions (Up to 10) to be computed and offers the minimal number of
equations (3) to validate the model.
In the case of failure at non-zero injection condition, it is observed that the required
change in operating points of the other controllers in the same cluster group exceeds the
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maximum possible change in operating point of the controller. For both these two test
scenarios with the same system topology, the DFM algorithm suggests a change in the
operating points of the other controllers even when the controller in concern does no inject
any reactance into the line. In results that correspond to condition 1 (p. 45), the results
should be indicative of a zero magnitude change, but, a minor change was noticed. This is a
result of two successive stages of approximation involved at estimating the bus voltages and
the limitations in the number of iterations used.
Tables 4.6 through 4.11 illustrate the effect of iterations on the currently chosen effec-
tiveness metric, namely, maximum deviation of bus voltage from nominal voltage. It is seen
that there is no significant gain (for the selected system and its operating point) obtained
by using multiple iterations.
The first tabulated result presented is for the 7-Bus, 3 Controller case (Table 4.6) where
controller between buses 2-5 is in operation, but, the algorithm is still tested to compute
new settings for the other two controllers in the system. It is observed that there is a minor
change computed by the algorithm even in this scenario. The reasons for this have been
summarized previously in this section.
Table 4.6: Testing the security of DFM Algorithm on 7-Bus, 3 Controller case using the
controller on line between buses 2-5. Computed using one iteration of DFM algorithm. ©
IEEE, 2018.
Computed ∆B12 Computed ∆B13 E
j0.0093 -j0.03 0.0015
Following this, the DFM algorithm is tested on the same system for a scenario where
the controller on line between buses 2-5 is operational. The system load distribution for this
result remains the same distribution of [1.12 1.57 1.50 0.80 1.50 3.0 2.0] p.u., for which the
above equivalent flows were elucidated. The results are presented in Table 4.7.
However, the above result goes beyond the possible changes in line impedances that
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Table 4.7: Testing the dependability of DFM Algorithm on 7-Bus, 3 Controller case using
the controller on line between buses 2-5. Computed using one iteration of DFM algorithm.
© IEEE, 2018.
Computed ∆B12 Computed ∆B13 E
j0.1677 -j0.124 0.0025
can be obtained by operation of D-FACTs. Thus, following the saturation of the D-FACTs
settings at the maximum possible value (±30%), the results obtained as as follows, surmised
in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Testing the dependability of DFM Algorithm on 7-Bus, 3 Controller case using
the controller on line between buses 2-5 and considering D-FACTs setting limits. Computed
using one iteration of DFM algorithm. © IEEE, 2018.
Computed ∆B12 Computed ∆B13 E
j0.0168 -j0.0459 0.003
Following the demonstration of results for the PowerWorld Demo case with 7-buses/3
Controllers, a set of results for the 7-buses/11 controllers case is demonstrated. The operating
state remains the same, and the results correspond to the stepwise computation of equivalent
power-flows detailed in the previous section.
Table 4.9: Testing the dependability of DFM Algorithm on 7-Bus/11 Controller case using
the controller on line between buses 2-5 and considering D-FACTs setting limits. Computed
using one iteration of DFM algorithm. © IEEE, 2018.
Computed ∆B12 Computed ∆B23 Computed ∆B34 Computed ∆B45 E
j0.0459 j0.0604 -j0.2412 -j0.0805 0.024
Following the above preliminary results that were obtained using single iteration com-
putations, the DFM algorithm is executed for algorithms for the results corresponding to
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Tables 4.8 and 4.9. The corresponding effectiveness metrics are presented in tables 4.10 and
4.11. Following a short remark on the results, discussion on these results are presented at
the end of this section, after discussing the overall system response.
Table 4.10: Variation of Effectiveness Metric with increase in iterations of DFM Algorithm
for 7-Bus, 3 Controller case in Table 4.8.
Scenario Maximum ∆V E
Failure State 0.05 -
Single Iteration 0.0252 0.0021
Three Iterations 0.0252 0.0021
Table 4.11: Variation of Effectiveness Metric with increase in iterations of DFM Algorithm
for 7-bus/11 Controller case in Table 4.8.
Scenario Maximum ∆V E
Failure State 0.05 -
Single Iteration 0.0232 0.024
Three Iterations 0.0253 0.022
It is observed that in the case of the 7-bus/11 Controller case that although the effec-
tiveness metric improves with increase in iterations, the maximum deviation of a bus voltage
from ideal per unit value (Set to be unity for all buses in this case) also increases. It is also
observed that the bus voltages do not improve with multiple iterations of the DFM algorithm
and can be said that, for small systems, single iteration is sufficient to be effective.
4.4.3 Results: Overall System Response
The controller settings are computed using the DFM algorithm illustrated above. The
first result presented is indicative of the settings used to demonstrate the overall algorithm,
while the second demonstrates a more practical application; the usefulness of the algorithm
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in relieving loaded lines, under a different load profile. The 7-Bus system is illustrated in
4.3.
For Controller #2 (compromised) with a high flow, the overall system response is demon-
strated for a Recurrent CE group comprising of controllers #1, 2, 3, 8, 9. The response does
not make any assumptions on the control objective developed either as a result of misop-
eration, or, adversial intrusion in operation. The Recurrent CE selection algorithm is most
successful in reducing the line flow, where the loading of Line 2 is reduced from 55% MVA
to 48.9% MVA.
Table 4.12: Responding to Controller 2 Compromise with Various Response Controllers
(C#) and Settings; Original MVAL2 = 44 %. Reproduced from [27].
Controller #2 Compromise (xDF = −0.072pu, 55% MVAL2)
Selection Method Response C# New xDF (pu) MVAL2
Recurrent CE 1,3,8,9 -0.015,-0.054,0.072,-0.018 48.9%
Recurrent R 4,5,6,7,10 -0.054,-0.036,0.018,-0.009,-0.072 51.4%
Current CE 4,5,7,8,9 -0.054,-0.036,-0.009,0.072,-0.018 51.1%
Current R 1,3,6,10 -0.015,-0.054,0.0171,-0.072 49.3%
Current Ranked R 1,10 -0.015,0.072 53.4%
In a second scenario (demonstrated below), again with controller # 2, The effectiveness
metric is changed in the last scenario to demonstrate that the overall response algorithm
can be implemented for different control objectives, with the key to efficacious results being
implementation of appropriate selection methods. The Recurrent CE selection algorithm is
found to be the most effective in this scenario while the ranked R is found to be the least
effective.
Following these initial results that include manual explained steps, the overall response
is demonstrated for a much larger system, in the following section.
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Table 4.13: Responding to Controller 2 compromise with various response controllers (C#)
at high load in the 7-bus system; Original MVAL2 = 89 %. Mean line flow is used as a metric
as the original system (before compromise) was structured to have similar line flows on all
other lines.
Controller #2 Compromise (Original Line Flow: 89% MVAL2)
Selection Method Response C # MVAL2 Mean of all other line flows MVAL2
Recurrent CE 1,3,8,9 79.6% 53.0%
Recurrent R 4,5,6,7,10 71.1% 56.4%
Current CE 4,5,6,7 76.7% 55.4%
Current R 1,3,7,10 76.6% 58.2%
Current Ranked R 1,3,10 79.9% 56.1%
4.5 Application: 118-Bus System
The IEEE 118-Bus system (Fig. 4.4) is tested for a single controller failure and a coordi-
nated controller attack. In first case demonsrated using this system, the controller on line 63
(illustrated in orange in Fig 4.4) is selected as the compromised controller, with Controllers
# 50, 68, 69 and 117 selected using the Recurrent R method, acting as the support groups,
highlighted in blue in Fig 4.4.
It is observed that the failure of the controller on Line 63 increases the overall real
power transmission loss by 4.03% and reactive power transmission loss by 57.71%. After
the recalculation of settings of the other controllers, the real power transmission loss did not
improve, while the reactive power transmission loss improved by 11% over the failure state.
These results are presented in Table 4.15. Additionally, Fig 4.5 visualizes the transmission
losses for the three scenarios (Before and during compromise of controller, Post mitigation)
as a fraction of the overall load demand of the system.
It was observed that post mitigation, a minor increase (of 0.87 MW) in real power
transmission losses existed, but, a considerable decrease in reactive power losses. This pattern
is observed across all such mitigations, and can be observed in the later results presented in
this section (Table 4.17). The recomputation of the settings of the other devices provides a
notable decrease in reactive power loss.
Following the above scenario of failure of a single D-FACTs device, the overall response
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Figure 4.4: IEEE 118-Bus system used to demonstrate overall system response. The orange
line is indicative of the single D-FACTs device under failure while the blue lines indicate the
response controllers.
strategy is demonstrated for a scenario of coordinated attack, where several essential con-
trollers on Lines 14, 63, 81 and 117 are compromised. The aim of this attack is to reduce
power-flow on lines with high capacity and force it to be routed through lines with low
capacity. The SDCD recomputes settings of controllers in other high capacity lines to mit-
igate this event. In this scenario, the high capacity lines have functional D-FACTS devices
that enable higher power-flow. Considering a scenario where these devices are compromised,
which leads to an increase in the effective impedance of these lines and forcing power to
reroute through other lines, increasing the loading on those lines that reduces the overall
system efficiency, and, at certain instances, cause a line to almost be fully loaded. In this
scenario, other controllers in the concerned support groups are selected and reconfigured
with the objective of rerouting power-flow through these support lines to improve system
efficiency while reducing the loading on lines that witnessed an increase in flow through
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Figure 4.5: Summary of the Transmission Losses in the 118-Bus system before and during
the compromise of a controller, and post mitigation of failure, highlighting the considerable
increase in reactive power loss and negligible increase in real power loss.
Table 4.14: Summary of the % MVA flows in the target lines during failure and post-
correction for the IEEE 118-bus system with the objective to reduce target line’s flow.
Controller #63 Compromise (Original: 84.76% MVAL63)






them. Table 4.16 provides a summary of the MVA flows in the lines during the functional
state of the target essential controllers during a coordinated attack. Table 4.17 provides
data pertaining to overall system efficiency that indicates how SDCD strategy can be used
to move the system closer to its original operational state during times of an attack, with
the metric of system losses being used here. In this juncture, it is pertinent to note that
the selection algorithm used for not the most effectively performing one, but, one of lower
effectiveness. It is pertinent to note from the results that the overall response is effective
even in scenarios where only controllers with lower impact (Recurrent R selection), that is,
redundantly ranked devices, are available for mitigation. Using more effective techniques
such as Current CE, Recurrent CE etc. will provide more benefit. The results of these other
selection techniques are compared in Table 4.17.
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Table 4.15: Summary of the real and reactive power flow losses in the IEEE 118-bus system
for a single controller attack scenario with the objective to reduce target line’s flow.












Before Failure 257.87 137.11 N/A N/A
During Failure 268.08 216.54 4.03% 57.713%
Post Correction 268.25 192.84 4.09% 40.6%
In summary, the IEEE 18-Bus system was tested for scenario of compromise and recal-
culation of settings of other controllers provided a satisfactory reduction in the power-flow
in the target line (that was compromised) and showed a distinct improvement in the overall
system efficiency.
Table 4.16: Change in line flows for a coordinated attack on essential controllers 14, 63, 18
and 118 using Recurrent R selection technique.
Power-Flow in Line (MVA)S. No Line Number Controller Role Before Attack During Attack After Mitigation us-
ing Recurrent R se-
lected controllers
1 14 Essential (Under Attack) 89 85 86
2 19 Mitigative 10 10 10
3 50 Mitigative 100 103 106
4 63 Essential (Under Attack) 400 388 385
5 68 Mitigative Parallel Lines 162 166 1746 69 162 166 174
7 81 Essential (Under Attack) 36 33 32
8 93 Mitigative 39 40 43
9 117 Essential (Under Attack) 171 162 158
10 118 Mitigative 134 140 149
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
The proposed algorithm to recompute settings provides an effective and considerable
corrective action to meet a control objective (Such as, compute settings while a voltage
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Table 4.17: Comparison of the effectiveness of selection techniques for the 118-Bus system.
It is observed that considerable improvement in losses are obtained even with redundant
(less effective) controllers.
S. No Mitigation Selection Technique Losses
- Normal Operation 264.471 MW, 181.327 MVAR
- Coordinated Attack Scenario 268.076 MW, 216.541 MVAR
1 Recurrent R 268.024 MW, 202.711 MVAR
2 Recurrent CE 268.917 MW, 187.337 MVAR
3 Current Ranked R 266.258 MW, 200.315 MVAR
range is not violated) and in situations of failure of non-critical controllers, the algorithm
provides corrective results that can offset the effect of failure.
The matrix inversion computed in the algorithm is not impractical for all practical con-
figurations except the case all buses are connected to all other buses. Since such a scenario
is extremely improbable, it is concluded that the DFM algorithm is not restricted by system
topology. The selected matrix is sparse, hence, suitable matrix inversion techniques can be
applied to make the computations feasible for larger systems.
The proposed methodology offers insights into designing operating ranges of controllers
to obtain better compensation in situations of failure, computing the support a controller
is expected to provide, and replacing it with the maximum value possible if the ceiling is
exceeded. However, for cases where there exists no coupling effect of adjacent lines on a
transmission line, this algorithm cannot be implemented.
The results of the change in effectiveness metric in the results of the 7-Bus system pro-
vides certain key insights into the system operation. While the Current CE and Current R
techniques (that factor-in the present operating point) provide a better reduction of power-
flow in Line 2 (the compromised line), when the measure of effectiveness is changed, selection
techniques that depend primarily on the system topology perform better. These results in-
dicate that the SDCD algorithm’s flexibility is effective in both restoring a system’s overall
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line flows to the original state before a compromise, or, restoring that of a particular line
alone. Depending on the objective, an appropriate selection technique can be used.
The results for the single controller attack scenario in the 118-Bus system provide multi-
ple key insights into the results: i) The results reiterate observations from the 7-bus system
that the line clusters and support groups need not be necessarily localized, and they are
highly dependent on system topology as well as the distribution of loads and generators
across the system; and, ii) results indicate how to utilize knowledge of the system to gener-
ate remedial schemes that ensure grid operation without limit violations using distributed
controllers in the system rather than merely using localized elements/devices in the immedi-
ate neighborhood. It should be noted at this juncture that within the context of the selected
contingency, larger parts refers to lines a couple of nodes away and not lines that are con-
nected to (electrically) far away nodes.
In conclusion, the DFM algorithm provides an effective technique of recomputing the
settings of devices that, as a part of a larger response process that achieves mitigation of
failure and/or misoperation of distributed dynamic support devices to meet a desired control
objective.
4.7 Comparison of Bayesian Network and Analytic Clustering Techniques
The analytic clustering techniques provide various selection techniques such as Recurrent
R, Current R etc., allowing the flexibility of choosing an appropriate technique that suits
the control objective. On the other hand, The Bayesian Network trained scheme provides
neither of these selection techniques, but rather, a mix of both. While the selection of devices
is primarily based on the current operating point of the system (Corresponding to Current
selection techniques), it is highly influenced by the total history of system that was used to
generate the Bayesian Network, which corresponds to the Recurrent selection techniques.
The Analytic clustering techniques allow the choice to either selection C/E controllers
or Redundant devices. This cannot be directly implemented in the BN based method.
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One simple and expensive solution is to generate datasets corresponding to each selection
technique and train a BN for each. However, given that this involves massive amounts of
redundancies, a simpler solution is to identify the states of all C/E controllers in the BN and
infer only the states of the redundant devices.
Another solution would be to use a combination of the two techniques, using the analytic
techniques to compute the support groups while the Bayesian Network takes the place of the
DFM algorithm, providing the new settings. While the demonstrated example uses binary
states and hence, cannot be compared directly to the DFM algorithm, better quantization of
(D-)FACTs settings while training the Bayesian Network would allow it to be interchangeably
used with the DFM algorithm.
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5. POWER SYSTEM VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
This section introduces power system vulnerability analysis using the transient small
signal frequency stability model. The presence of system parameters in the stability equa-
tions is leveraged to build a mathematical model of the system that can be used for both
developing system attacks as well as develop mitigation strategies. This section starts by
introducing state space modeling of a system in Section 5.1 and the following section, Section
5.2 provides an introduction to the small signal stability model of a power system that has
been traditionally used and explains why it is used despite better transient models being
available. The mathematical model developed is explained in the succeeding section and
the applications of the model are summarized afterwards. The application of the model to
a few small systems are explained and the finally, comprehensive results for the IEEE-118
Bus system are presented at the end. Following this, an explanation of how the model de-
veloped can be utilized as a defense technique against itself are explained, followed by a few
applications that are explained conceptually.
5.1 State Space Modeling
State Space Modeling of a system is a representation of the system variables in terms
of a mathematical construct relating ‘internal states’ with system inputs and outputs. The
internal states of a system, often labeled as ‘x’, is defined as the minimal set of variables
pertaining to the system that can completely represent the system at some given instant of
time. The system input variables, u, and output variables, y are represented as a construct
of themselves and the internal states. Mathematically,
ẋ = Ax+Bu (5.1)
y = Cx+Du (5.2)
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In the above equation pair (State Equation and Output Equation), the parameter vectors
utilized are (i) Controlled Inputs (u), (ii) System States (x), and (iii) System Outputs (y).
The matrices utilized are:
1. ‘A’ = State transmission matrix, capturing the relationship between the state variables
and the rate of change of state variables.
2. ‘B’ = Input matrix, depicting the relationship between the input vectors and state
variables.
3. ‘C’ = Output matrix, depicting the relation between the internal states and the output
variables.
4. ‘D’ = Feedforward matrix (Usually zero matrix).
It can be seen from the fact that the D matrix is usually zero that the internal states of
the system play a critical role in system model, and hence, must be selected such such that
there are minimum uncertainties in its estimate/measurement. The state variables perform
four functions [30], namely:
1. Memory: The state variables capture an effective summary of the history of the system.
2. Internal variables that along with their derivatives can be used to represent any output
variable.
3. Minimality: Since the number of state variables selected are a minimal set, no further
simplifications are possible without compromising the order of the equations being
order 1 (linear).
4. Non-Uniqueness: “Any set of n-independent internal variables, not directlyconnected
to the input, represents the system. By independent we meaneach one representing a
different storage process.” (Quoted from [30, p. 23]).
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State Space modeling is a powerful tool that can be applied for both SISO and MIMO
systems, given that it places no initial condition constraints (such as zero initial condition
of Laplace transforms).
Stability of a system represented by State Space Modeling is checked using the State
Transmission Matrix. Stability is checked using eigenvalues of State transmission matrix;
mathematically, this can be proved by converting state space to transfer functions:
y(s)
u(s)
= C(sI − A)−1B +D (5.3)
This is also reflected practically. For instance, Controllability is defined as a measure of the
ability of the controlled input to force a state of the system from one value to another in finite
time. Although this classical definition intuitively indicates that only the B matrix plays
a role, it not so. Transition from one state to another depends on both present state and
input. For example: Different magnetic fields are produced in an electromechanical device
depending on whether it is saturated or not, even when you increase the input voltage by the
same amount. Mathematically too, controllability matrix is computed using both A and B
matrices, by checking the rank of a compound matrix formed by the adjunct matrix formed
by the products of the A and B matrices [31, 30].
Figure 5.1 represents the State Space representation of a system, highlight the variables
and equations.
However, despite all these powerful benefits, State space modeling needs adaptation for
usage in power systems. The points of conflict are
1. No system I/Os in Power Systems that match the traditional definition of controlled
inputs and system outputs.
2. The availability of excess variables: What is the criterion for categorizing a parameter
as a state, input or output variable?
3. What parts of the system and what variables should be considered to make it to one
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Figure 5.1: State Space Representation of a system.
of the three categories?
4. State space modeling is for linear systems. Power Systems are not linear, how can they
be adapted suitably?
5. What power system model do you use for modeling? Different models for different
scales (Steady state PF models, transient models).
While the traditional definition of controlled inputs and outputs are not directly ap-
plicable in this context, existing literature has utilized linearized power system equations
(AC-PF) to represent them in the form of state space models, with transient models being
invariably represented as linearized state space equations, with the linearization being per-
formed around the system operating point [32]. The selection of the input, state and output
variables is dependent on the model, and, one such model that is utilized is explained in the
following section.
5.2 Power System Small Signal Stability Analysis
The Small Signal Model of a Power System is a Transient Time representation of the
system frequency based on the parameters of the generation and transmission system [33]. It
utilizes the [mechanical] radial speed of the devices connected electrically to the system, the
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grid electric frequency, machine inertial constant, internal machine voltages and equivalent
line impedances. It is a fundamental model, simplifying many of the system behaviors. It
assumes that the mechanical power input to the [rotational] generator, Pm, is constant, that
the damping of the machine is negligible, that the voltage behind the transient reactance is
constant (Fig. 5.2) and that the rotor angle and voltage angle are in phase not only during
steady-state operation, but, also during transient operation [33].
Figure 5.2: Transient Circuit Representation of Synchronous Generator with internal and
terminal voltages, transient reactance labeled that is used in iterative calculations.
While more accurate and sophisticated models exist, the Small Signal model is utilized
for the analysis as it provides a simple mathematical construct that can be used to optimize
a selected objective based a cost function derived from the mathematical construct. The
parameters utilized are explained in Table 5.1.
For some bus ‘i’ (1 ≤ i le ng), the power angle, δi at that bus is defined as:
δi = ωi − ωs (5.4)












The equation of radial speed is nonlinear, and hence, cannot be represented as a state
space system of the form ẋ = Ax + Bu and y = Cx + Du. Thus, the two equations are
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Table 5.1: Tabulation of parameters used Power System Small Signal Frequency Analysis.
n Number of buses
ng Number of buses with generators
m Number of lines
Vi Voltage at bus ‘i’
θi Voltage angle at bus ‘i’
ωi Machine radial speed at bus ‘i’
ωs Machine mechanical radial frequency at bus ‘i’ that corresponds to
grid electrical radial frequency.
Si=Pi + jQi Complex power at bus ‘i’
SGi=PGi + jQGi Complex power injection at bus ‘i’
SLi=PLi + jQLi Complex power consumption at bus ‘i’
YBus = G +jB Equivalent Admittance matrix of the system of order ngxng
Subscripts
i,j Bus indices (0 ≤ i, j ≤ ng)
linearized around the operating point of the system. Let δ∗ = [δ1 δ2...δng ] represent the
operating point vector of the equivalent system (With non-generating nodes equivalenced)
at all buses. The corresponding radial frequency set-point would be ω∗ = [ωs1 ωs2...ωsng ].
Based on this linearization, the system state variables (x) are assigned as change in power
angle, ∆δi and change in radial speed, ∆ωi. However, the power angle requires a reference,
and thus, ∆δ1 is selected as a reference, and the remaining power angles are converted to
changes in angles, ∆θi. Thus, the state variables are:
1. ∆θi (i = 2 to ng)
2. ∆ωi (i = 1 to ng)
The state vector is formed in the form x = [∆ω1 ∆θ2 ∆ω2 ∆θ3...]. The corresponding















∆θk = ∆ωk −∆ω1 (5.7)
63
where the indices i, k range from 1 to ng and 2 to ng respectively. Once the corresponding
A matrix is computed, its eigenvalues are computed to check for system stability. If all the
eigenvalues have real parts that do not life in the Right Hand Side Plane of the Real-
Imaginary plane, the system is stable.
5.3 Mathematical Analysis
This section provides the usage of the State Transmission Matrix, A, explained in the
previous section to develop a mathematical model that can be used to optimize for a set of
system parameter values that are used in the applications illustrated later in this section.
The State Transmission Matrix computed has elements that are either zero, unity (±1)
or some functional value dependent on the system state. The form of the matrix is:
A =

0 ̸= 0 0 ̸= 0 0 · · · ̸= 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 ̸= 0 0 ̸= 0 0 · · · ̸= 0 0
−1 0 0 0 1 · · · 0 0
... ... ... ... ... . . . ... ...
−1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 ̸= 0 0 ̸= 0 0 · · · ̸= 0 0

(5.8)
The elements of −1 and +1 correspond to ∆θk parameters, derived from ∆ωk − ∆ω1.
The nonzero values indicated correspond to element values of ∆ωi, reflecting the system
parameters and operating points. There are patterns in the A matrix, but, they cannot be
leveraged unless the terms are regrouped to collect all the zero and unity elements together.
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By grouping all the angle and speed terms together, a broad pattern emerges in the A
matrix. It can be divided into five smaller sections, two sections of zero matrices, a section
with an Identity matrix, a column vectors of all elements −1 and a matrix of order ngxng
reflective the system parameter and states. The resultant matrix is of the form:
A =

0 · · · 0 −1 1 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 −1 0 1 · · · 0
... . . . ... ... 0 ... . . . ...
0 · · · 0 −1 0 0 · · · 1
̸= 0 · · · ̸= 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
̸= 0 · · · ̸= 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
... . . . ... ... ... ... . . . ...
̸= 0 · · · ̸= 0 0 0 0 · · · 0

(5.10)
The five distinct individual matrices/vectors that can be made out are:
1. A square zero matrix of order ng − 1.
2. A column vector of elements with negative unity, order ng − 1.
3. Identity matrix of order ng − 1.




5. A square zero matrix of order ng.
These five divisions can be utilized to simplify the mathematical construct that is used in









Define Aλ = λI−A for some scalar quantity λ. Thus, the structure of Alambda obtained
is:
Aλ =





For the system to have transients indicative of frequency instability, there should exist
some λ such that its real part is positive, that is:
∃ λ′ ∈ Sol{|Aλ| = 0} : Re{λ′} > 0
Thus, the goal of the mathematical construct that is desired to be obtained is to make
it indicative of some λ′ such that it can be utilized to provide greater information about the
system parameters. Thus, define a matrix the same order of Aλ, called a “Spoof” matrix,
with all elements except those corresponding to the position of Fng ∏(ng−1) as zero. Let the
matrix be denoted as ∆F with the elements being denoted as ∆fij.
Let∆Fi be a matrix that denotes each column of∆F matrix that has at least one nonzero
element. For some column vector ui which has zeros in all elements except the ith element
corresponding to +1, ∆Fi. Now, define ∆F ′i as ∆Fi
∏
ui. Thus,
∆F = ∆F ′1 +∆F
′
2 + · · ·+∆F ′ng−1 (5.13)
Thus, the desired matrix that is indicative of a point of instability can be obtained as
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the sum of a few column vectors multiplied by a single element. Alternatively, they can be
obtained (possibly faster) by merely appending ng − 1 number of column vectors, but, the
multiplicative notation is used as it allows for greater simplification in the final mathematical
construct.
By Matrix determinant lemma, for a square matrix X, column vectors y and z, the
determinant of their sum X + yzT can be expressed as:
|X + yzT | = |X|(1 + zTX−1y) (5.14)
Thus, the determinant of the desired state transmission matrix A′λ that is indicative of system
instabilities can be computed as:




2 + · · ·∆F
′
n| (5.15)




∆Fi · ui| (5.16)
However, the final matrix obtained is of one where the matrix determinant lemma has to
be applied recursively. This is computation expensive. The recursive equation obtained is a
nonlinear sum of a linear sum of linearized nonlinear equations. Further linearization need
not necessarily be helpful in maintaining the accuracy of the system model. Small signal
model in its fundamental premise neglects parameters like damping and makes assumptions
about power input and rotor=voltage angle synchronization. Any further approximation
will add to the errors.
However, for Power Systems, it was observed based on trial runs on various systems (Six
systems with 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 54 generators) that using just the first summation term was
sufficient to obtain an matrix that serves the same purpose as the one computed with the
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recursive set of equations. That is, this complex equation can be simplified by considering
only one of the ∆Fi matrices. While, sometimes (Always, for larger systems!), the same
A
′
λ will not be obtained, it is important to note that the goal is to get an A
′
λ that does
not violate a desired set of system constraints and is indicative of instability, not to find an
A
′
λusing the most accurate difference equations. The mathematical construct is not the final
result, but, an intermediary result that is used to compute the mismatch in each iteration
that leads to the final results. Hence, simplifying the difference equations to compute it can
be done without affecting the final results, it only increases the number of iterations required
and the final parameter-wise distribution, not the nature of the results itself.
Thus, considering only the first column vector yields:
|A′λ| = |Aλ +∆F1 · u1| = (1 + uT1A−1λ ∆F1)|Aλ| (5.17)

















C(p+n−1,1)∆Fp,2) = 0 (5.19)
Where C is the cofactor matrix of Aλ and the indices p, n, and 2 indicate the generator
number and not matrix row/columns.
Thus, using the above equation (Eqn. 5.3) as an equality constraint, various optimization
problems can be deployed, which elucidated in the following sections. A more detailed,
stepwise derivation of the equation is provided in the appendices, along with another simpler,
but, computationally more expensive mathematical construct that is obtained along with it.
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5.4 Application: Small Signal Stability Model Based Power System Spoof At-
tack
The above mathematical constraint acts as a powerful tool when a reasonably accurate
estimate of the system states are known. One such applications of it include the generation of
spoof attacks for a randomly selected number of parameters, or, a targeted set of parameters.
The primary goal of a motivated attacker with access to system states would be to launch
spoof attacks that forces the system to respond in an undesirable way. This could include
extreme situation like spoofing parameters to make it seem that line currents are above
normal levels. Since they are physically not so, they would not be picked up by local
protection systems, leading to a wider area system response that leads to frequency instability
that triggers other protection devoces, and possibly, investigation into the functioning of the
local protection systems. While attacks generated with such techniques do not have the
capability to cause major damage to operation, they do cause economic penalties. The
goal can be said to be to use the small signal stability model of the system to find some
spoof vector that can force a system from normal operation state to Alert/Emergency state
(Converse is also possible). This is illustrated in Fig 5.3∗.
The SSSV based spoof attack generator model operates in two stages, namely, (i) The
Parameter Checker, and (ii) The Spoof Value Generator. The first stage requires an estimate
of relevant system states to function. Based on the states available, either a set of random
parameters that are observable based on the states, or, a target set of states desired by the
user are selected. These parameters are computed using an iterative method such that Eqn.
5.3 is satisfied. Once this is obtained, the second stage computes the values of the parameters
that satisfies the equation. The overall process is implemented using the following steps:
∗The base image for which is reproduced from ECEN 615 (Fall 2018) Lecture note # 27 of T. Overbye
(Dept of ECE, TAMU), which is derived from L.H. Fink and K. Carlsen, Operating under stress and strain,
IEEE Spectrum, March 1978, pp. 48-53. [12]
69
Figure 5.3: Objective of Utilizing the Small Signal Stability Vulnerability (SSSV) Model to
generate Spoof Attacks. The direction of the goal is highlighted in orange.



















where fS denotes Eqn. 5.3.
2. Compute the partial derivatives of the new function mismatch matrix, F ′S with respect
to the selected parameters. Let this be the modified Jacobian Matrix, JS.
3. Use iterative Newton-Raphson technique to solve for the parameters from their current
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estimate to a value that forces all mismatch equations, including fS to tend to zero.
4. Enforce any constraints necessary on the parameters and continue iterations till con-
vergence.
5. Once convergence is obtained, the present values of the parameters are outputted as
the final spoof values.
It should be noted that the recursive computations in the above techniques can be utilized
with additional constraints such as line limits etc., but, since only a certain fraction of the
measurements are utilized, unless the new states vary widely from the original, no line limits
will be avoided. While implementing this algorithm in §5.4.3, constraints are placed on the
spoofed variables so that they do not violate any operating limits, thereby ensuring that
the values do not deviate greatly from their original value, and also passively enforcing line
limits. Line limits can be additionally included in this algorithm, but, given that constraints
on the parameters themselves can be constructed to account for constraints on limits, it
can be excessive. While directly including the line limits would make it straightforward
to compute the constraints on the parameters being spoofed, the addition of additional
constraints increases convergence time. However, the common ground is that any reasonable
constraint on system operation can be implemented. A more tight constraint, wherein, a
parameter is not allowed to greatly vary is less likely to provide a set of parameters that
can induce frequency instability unless the number of parameters chosen enough are large
enough. These tradeoffs are discussed during the application of this method to the IEEE
118-Bus system.
The key characteristics of the mathematical construct are:
1. Since stability is checked as a loop condition, simplification of the matrix determinant
condition is immaterial to the results.
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2. Pseudoinverse always exists for a stable system with a normal N-R solution. Hence,
iterations are not constrained.
3. Can be used to generate spoof attack values for all steady-state parameters:
(a) Real Power (Generation and Load)
(b) Reactive Power (Generation and Load)
(c) Bus Voltages
(d) Bus Angles
The overall process of generating spoof parameters is illustrated in Fig. 5.4. The appli-
cation of the equation is explained with equations for a few smaller systems in the following
subsections before its demonstration for a larger system.
Figure 5.4: Stage-wise Depiction of the SSSV Spoof Attack Generator Model.
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5.4.1 Application: 2 Generator System
Consider a system with 2 generators, and an equivalenced circuit as shown in Fig. 5.5.







Solving the above matrix to find a λ that has a positive real part yields the constraint
F11 − F12 > 0. Assuming that F11 and F12 are of the forms −Acosδ∗12 − Bsinδ∗12 and




Figure 5.5: Equivalencing a system with 2 Generators into a 2-Bus Equivalent. Equivalent
Loads not depicted.
Thus, for this elementary case, the values of A, B, C, D should be optimized to get the
desired parameter values.
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5.4.2 Application: 3 Generator System
In this case (Fig. 5.6), the presence of three generators in a system produces six function
terms, labeled as Fij, with the indices taking possible values of i = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2.
Repeating the same process as in the 2 Generator case, the constraint obtained is
F11(F22 − F32) + F21(F32 − F12) + F31(F12 − F22) > 0
Figure 5.6: Equivalencing a system with 3 Generators into a 3-Bus Equivalent. Equivalent
Loads not depicted.
Optimizing the selected parameters based on the above relation provides the desired
spoof values. No simple pattern relating the parameters and stability boundaries exist for
scenarios with more than three generators.
74
5.4.3 Application: IEEE 118-Bus System
The IEEE 118-Bus System (Same as the one used in previous sections) is used as a base
to generate spoof attacks that cause frequency instability in the system. The parameters
chosen for the attack generation were bus voltages and angles, although scope for inclusion
of other system variables exist, as discussed previously.
While computing the voltages and angles, the voltages were restricted to 0.90− 1.15 p.u.
while the angles were restricted to 0 ± 27◦. If any of the original voltages or angles fell
outside the angle, they were allowed to vary till that limit. The initial test was performed
using a random number of evenly distributed selections, starting with a minimum of two
measurements compromised, and progressing upto 40 measurements. Fig. 5.7 shows per-
centage of attacks that were successful in pushing the system from normal (N – 1 reliable)
operation state to alert/emergency states based on the number of random buses selected for
attacks. A total of 2000 random attacks were conducted, from which 157 were filtered in the
first stage as effective. It is important to note that the barchart in Fig. 5.7 does not show
probability of attack vector being undetected or probability of injection, but, probability
of causing physical parameters of the system (System States) to respond undesirably given
that an attack was successful.
It should be noted that while machine damping is ignored in the iterative computations,
a simplified damping model, with a positive damping factor is assumed when checking for the
stability and the success of the attack. It is worth noting that if damping is not considered all
together, then, the success rate would consistently be 100%, and should the developed model
work solely in such cases where damping is completely ignored, it would make it impossible
to practically utilize it.
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Figure 5.7: Initial Results of Evenly Distributed Random Attacks on the IEEE 118-Bus
System.
Although an increase in probability of attack success is expected as number of target
buses increase, this general trend has as many exceptions in the results as adherences in the
result. This is most probably due to the number of random combinations used being smaller
than the possible number of combinations. For instance, 100 random buses of 118 possible
buses were tested for 1 bus attack scenario. However, when 2 bus scenarios was considered,
only 100 of 6903 possible 2 bus attacks were tested. The greatest outlier from the ascending
trend was when a combination of 14 random buses were used to attack the system. The code
tested only 100 of the possible 5.21E17 combinations! Thus, another blind random test was
executed, to compare the results. The results of this run are presented in Fig. 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Results of Evenly Distributed Random Attacks on the IEEE 118-Bus System
after Second Run.
Following this blind testing, the system was selected for a more systematic number of
attacks. 100 unobservable attack vectors covering 20 measurements across the system were
crafted, with the selection of measurements being random. While the randomness of selection
is reduced (In the sense of randomness in number of measurements selected being selected),
the measurements are targeted. This provides a significantly improved result, with a 12x
(Twelve times) improvement in the success rate. At this junction, it is important to note that
‘Success rate’ is considered to be the probability of selected a set of measurements that can
be used to launch an unobservable attack that causes frequency instability. Following this,
the number of randomly attacked measurements is increased to 10% of the total number
of voltage and angle measurements in the system. No improvements in the success rate
was observed. For this scenario, the movement of the eigenvalues of the State Transmission
Matrix for two of the one hundred scenarios is depicted in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.
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Figure 5.9: Movement of Eigenvalues of the Transmission Matrix (from LHS to RHS of the
Re-Im plane) for a scenario where instability was induced after two iterations.
Figure 5.10: Movement of Eigenvalues of the Transmission Matrix (from LHS to RHS of the
Re-Im plane) for a scenario where instability was induced after four iterations.
Following this, targeted attacks were launched at the system, with the targets being se-
lected by decomposing the Vulnerability Equation, fS into bus-wise terms. A wide ranging
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number of attacks, starting at 10 buses/20 measurements and going upwards of 40 measure-
ments were employed. This provided a significantly much larger success rate.
The results of all the above scenarios are tabulated in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Summary of the various SSSV Model based Attacks on the IEEE 118-Bus System.
Method of crafting Attack Vector Success Rate
Random (Number of measurements targeted unaccounted for) 0.75%
Random (10 buses targeted) 9%
Random (12 buses– 10% of total buses targeted) 9%
Random (Maximum success rate/No. of buses targeted) 16%/19 buses
Targeted (Overall) 33%
Targeted (Most efficient/No. of buses targeted) 60%/14 buses
5.5 Application: Defending Attacks launched using it
This section illustrates the applications of the SSSV model that can be used as defensive
techniques that assist in system analysis. For defensive applications, the equality constraint
is converted to an inequality constraint and the system is optimized for desirable results.






C(p+ n− 1, 1)∆Fp,2) ̸= 0 (5.22)
5.6 Further Applications: Conceptual Explanations
This section continues on the defensive applications of the SSSV model, but, provides
only conceptual explanations, without providing for numeric results. Some of the results are
similar to those presented in earlier sections, while some others are beyond the scope of this
work, and are hence, not elucidated further than their conceptual applications.
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5.6.1 Recomputing Device Settings
This technique acts as a more powerful version of the DFM algorithm that is used to
compute the settings of FACTs device. Unlike the DFM algorithm that required conversion
of reactive power injection into apparent change in impedance, the SSSV model is more
directly, allowing for direct injections of reactive power to be incorporated in it. It can be
compliment with models of the FACTs device to get the settings of the device directly, so
as long as the model can be used to obtain a partial differential (sensitivity) equation that
is reflective of the device’s range of operation states.
While the SSSV Model is far more powerful, it is more complicated, taking longer time
to perform similar computations. For D-FACTs devices, as previously demonstrated using
DFM algorithm, the SSSV model can be used to compute apparent change in impedance.
For traditional FACTs devices computed to buses, it can be used to computed reactive injec-
tion. Since the numeric results corresponding to this application are same as those presented
in the previous section, they are not repeated here.
5.6.2 Analyzing Impact of Data Accuracy on System Responses
The analysis of change in system parameter values on its response using the SSSV model
is obtained by including the parameter as a variable to be spoofed. In this scenario, instead of
acceptable range of parameters being based on operating characteristics, the % uncertainty
in the measurement is used to set the acceptable range of the parameter(s). Once this is set,
the mathematical construct is iteratively computed, with the final steady state results (That
correspond to highest level of uncertainty of the combination) being indicative of system
response during worst-case response. It is important to note that the worst-case uncertainty
of the set of parameters need not correspond to the individual worst-case uncertainties, as a
system is linear. That is, for instance, if a set of parameters include a load estimate of 150
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MW ± 10%, then, it is possible that the overall worst case points to an uncertainty that is
neither +10%, nor -10% of the load estimate.
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6. SUMMARY
In this thesis, the first section presented a review of literature relevant to the work
presented in the later sections. The first original work presented in this thesis, namely, the
use of Bayesian Networks of system clustering analysis provided an insight into alternative
avenues to analytic computation techniques for clustering analysis of FACTs devices, and,
power-system lines in general.
The following section introduced the Distributed Failure Mitigation (DFM) Algorithm
that provides an iterative computation technique to compute the settings of controllers to
meet a specified adjective. The same section indicates the use of existing literature to the
thesis, demonstrating the use of existing techniques and combining it with the DFM algo-
rithm to provide an overall system response to tackle device failure and coordinated attacks.
The next section provided insights into techniques of analyzing system vulnerability and
using a common mathematical construct to both study offensive and defensive strategies
towards system operation. The offensive operations were demonstrated with the use of
generating spoof voltage values to force the system to shift from normal (N - 1 Reliable)
operating state to an alert state. The defensive operations were conceptually explained to
indicate how to avoid vulnerability points in the system operating states. It additionally
explained the usage of the mathematical construct to compute controller settings.
The first section of original work explored alternative methods to fasten dynamic de-
vice selection while the second provided analytic techniques of response. The final section
provided a larger perspective on vulnerabilities of system to frequency instability and unde-
sired triggering of local protection systems, with indications of how it can be constructed to




This thesis introduced the use of probabilistic graphical models for dynamic reactive sup-
port device selection, methodologies of computing controller settings on-line and a broader
technique of analyzing system vulnerabilities. The computation techniques were deployed for
D-FACTs, which are practically deployed and allow for dynamic change in settings. Thus,
apart from primarily mitigation of device failures and misoperations, the algorithms can be
used to fine-tune the system response to improve economic operation, which can be achieved
by using an appropriate control objective. The vulnerability analysis provides insights into
the interactions of the various parameters in the system and highlights how certain combina-
tion of parameters that result in stable steady-state operation can have transient responses
that deviate considerably from an ideal response.
In summary, contribution of this thesis to existing literature is:
1. Usage of Graphical Models to explore scope of improving controller operation.
2. Developing analytic techniques of computing controller techniques that can be used in
situations of failure, misoperation, or, be used to fine-tune controller settings to meet
a control objective.
3. Provide insights into system operation by indicating what desired steady-state states of
operation are achieved through non-stable or non-optimum transient paths of system
frequency.
7.2 Potential for Future Work
The potential for future work includes the incorporation of more system parameters
to improve the predictions of the Bayesian Network based inference technique, apart from
utilizing multinomial states. The techniques of vulnerability analysis can be extended to
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compute controller operation states. The present technique uses the fundamental Small
Systems Stability model, and usage of more accurate and detailed models developed since
will provide far better results and more accurate insights.
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APPENDIX A
PROBABILITY TABLES FOR BAYESIAN NETWORK
This appendix provides a tabulation of the the probabilities of a node assuming a value
of unity given the states of its parents. The results correspond to §3.4.
Table A.1: Probability Table of PG1 = 1.





Table A.2: Probability Table of PG2 = 1.






Table A.3: Probability Table of PG4 = 1.
P3 P4 P5 P(PG4 = 1 | P3, P4, P5)
0 0 0 0.168
0 0 1 0.283
0 1 0 0.300
0 1 1 0.505
1 0 0 0.276
1 0 1 0.466
1 1 0 0.492
1 1 1 0.830
Table A.4: Probability Table of I1 = 1.
PG1 P(I1 = 1 | PG1)
0 0.459
1 0.541
Table A.5: Probability Table of I2 = 1.
PG1 PG2 PG5 P(I2 = 1 | PG1, PG2, PG5)
0 0 0 0.314
0 0 1 0.403
0 1 0 0.421
0 1 1 0.540
1 0 0 0.398
1 0 1 0.510
1 1 0 0.534
1 1 1 0.684
Table A.6: Probability Table of I3 = 1.
PG1 PG2 PG5 P(I3 = 1 | PG1, PG2, PG5)
0 0 0 0.255
0 0 1 0.340
0 1 0 0.448
0 1 1 0.596
1 0 0 0.310
1 0 1 0.413
1 1 0 0.543
1 1 1 0.724
92
Table A.7: Probability Table of B1 = 1.
I1 PG1 I2 P(B1 = 1 | I1, PG1, I2)
0 0 0 0.4658
0 0 1 0.339
0 1 0 0.339
0 1 1 0.247
1 0 0 0.747
1 0 1 0.545
1 1 0 0.545
1 1 1 0.397
Table A.8: Probability Table of B2 = 1.





Table A.9: Probability Table of B3 = 1.





DERIVATION OF SSSV EQUATIONS
Step-wise derivation of the SSSV Model equation (Eqn. 5.3) is presented here.
Consider a generic ‘n’ generator system (Note: Notation change in the appendix from ng
to n).
|Aλ| → 0 = λC11 + (−1)n+1C1n + (−1)n+1C1,n+1 → 0 (B.1)
Dividing the above equation by λ, resulting in a corresponding reduction of the order of
C1n and C1,n+1 to C ′1n and C ′1,n+1 yields:
C11 + (−1)n+1C ′1n + (−1)
n+1C ′1,n+1 → 0 (B.2)
Dropping the row denotation in the cofactors, and accounting for the possible values of ‘n’
(that is, even and odd), yields the following constraint:
|C1| − |C ′n − C ′n+1| = 0 (B.3)
The above straightforward constraint can be utilized in lieu of Eqn. 5.3, but, it is
not scalable for large systems. Hence, it is not implemented. Thus, going back to the
representation of A′λ = Aλ + ∆F , and considering only one column of computations, the
equation obtained is:





) → 0 (B.5)
=⇒ uT1 co(Aλ)T∆F1 + |Aλ| → 0 (B.6)
=⇒ [C11 C21 · · ·Cn−1,1 C1,n · · · C1,2n−1][0 · · · 0∆F11 · · ·∆F1n]T + |Aλ| → 0 (B.7)
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C(p+ n− 1, 1)∆Fp,2) = 0 (B.8)
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